BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE TEXT
(FRENCH PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND THE FIGURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL – FROM SARTRE TO FOUCAULT)

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Abstract. What I am trying to do in the present text is to draw a sketch of postwar French philosophy from the perspective of the question of relations between philosophy and politics. I am showing a distinction between the community and the text that is present in this philosophy from Sartre to Barthes to Foucault and beyond. The general passage from the community-oriented philosophy (which I call "Hegelian") to the text-oriented philosophy (which I call "Nietzschean") took place in the sixties, following the books by Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, and Pierre Klossowski on Nietzsche. I am discussing the formulation of this opposition by Jean-Paul Sartre ("the aesthete"/"the engaged writer"), its reversal suggested by Roland Barthes ("authors"/"writers") and, finally, an attempt made by Michel Foucault to go beyond the very oppositions pertaining to "writing" as such in his dichotomy of "universal intellectuals"/"specific intellectuals". The passage from the French Hegel to the French Nietzsche as a "master thinker" in French philosophy was also a manifest passage from the community to the text as a main focus of philosophical interest, and the discussion of relations between philosophy and politics is at the same time that of the role, place, tasks and obligations of the philosopher in culture. The detour to these discussions is made in order to stress the continuity of the text/community (or Hegelian/Nietzschean) opposition in current debates on postmodernity and to ask about relations between philosophy and politics today.

1.

Those who love wisdom (philosophers) and those who love power have always exerted a mesmeric influence on one another. The roads of the philosopher and the City, the philosopher and the ruler, the roads of truth and politics have always crossed, with various results. We know from history famous alliances, commented on over the centuries, taken either (more often) as a warning or (less often) as an
ideal to be imitated by future generations: Plato and Dionysius from Syracuse, Aristotle (already wiser, being rich with Platonic experience – the end of political attempts at the slave market) and Alexander the Great, Hegel and Napoleon (e.g. in Kojève’s version) or, later, Hegel and Friedrich of Prussia (in Popper’s version), and finally Heidegger and Nazism as well as Lukács and Stalinist Marxism. These were different alliances, with different degrees of intensity, conviction or faith, deriving from different motivations – from naiveté, noble outbursts of spirit, heart, and mind, to consent to evil and a choice of lesser evil, to cold philosophical and political calculation. Each pair of relations referred to here would require a separate analysis and reflection specific to them, for it was something radically different that was desired in various periods of life and philosophizing by Hegel, by Heidegger, and still different were motives followed by Lukács.¹ I would not like to leave the impression that I am unaware of abysses separating the aforementioned philosophers’ alliances with power (I am intentionally using the word “alliance” in a somewhat ambivalent and indeterminate sense). These were various philosophers and various powers: it is difficult to compare any of the two cases – Plato’s and Aristotle’s relation to power is incommensurable², just like Heidegger and Lukács’ involvements³ (at first sight) might seem the closest in time to themselves and to us. The only thing I want to show at that introductory stage of my discussion is the fact that even the greatest philosophers (or should one perhaps say: especially the greatest?) have entered or have been dragged into complicated relations with power, no matter whether we take into account Ancient Greece, Romantic or post-Weimar Germany. I am convinced that the junction of truth and politics, philosophy and power, the question of the “spiritual” or “intellectual” revolution, of the thinking/action distinction, of “Epicurean gardens” on the one hand and political and philosophical “propaganda” on the other hand (to refer here to the famous debate between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève⁴), of “microphysics” of power

¹ See e.g. Tom Rockmore, (1995:148–149) who categorically rejects the possibility of comparing political involvement of Heidegger and Lukács, motivating it by the fact that Lukács performed harsh criticism of Stalinism and never hid the nature or the extent of his engagement, which cannot be said of Heidegger (which is perhaps best shown in a political biography by Hug Ott (1993)).

² Which is strongly stressed by Hannah Arendt in a brilliant text “Truth and Politics” from Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought who refers the reader back to Aristotle’s statements in Book VI of Nicomachean Ethics.

³ As Stefan Morawski (1985:284) says in a text “From the History of a Self-Mutilated Mind”: “Lukács ... reasoned here [in The Destruction of Reason] according to a political key, in its most extreme version. ‘Who is not with us, is against us’ – that is his standpoint”.

⁴ Leo Strauss’ “Epicurean” attitude, a strictly isolated life of the philosopher who lives “outside the world”, practices pure theory with no necessary connection to “action” is “fundamentally mistaken”, according to Kojève (see especially their debate recently expanded with years-long correspondence in (Strauss 1991)).
as opposed to its Marxist account etc – that all these belong today – as they almost always did – to the most important focusing points for thought, both about the past, as well as, first of all, about the present and the future.

The way of thinking about philosophy and politics seems to be strictly connected with the account of the philosopher’s place in society – with the answer we attempt to give to the question of the role of, more generally, the writer in culture. It is worthwhile to think over and refer to one another three separate, although related categories: the philosopher, intellectual, writer. For the time being, let us think about “writing” in the broadest sense so that we could try to trace and then sketch meanders of choices and obligations, decisions and expectations of the writer and those which are accorded to him by others. We would like to draw a common ethos in French thinking starting with the end of the nineteenth century to our postmodern times. We are choosing France because it is the French shadow that is darkest with respect to the philosopher and the intellectual (see Kwiek 1996, 1997), it was there that until recently (or perhaps still?) they were highly respected as their place was inscribed in social structures and cultural atmosphere since les philosophes, and then since the Dreyfus affair.

Let us say the following at the very beginning: we want to trace two themes that have been struggling and coexisting for over a hundred years, to show their constant presence and unchangeable opposition on the basis of a couple of examples. One of the themes we want to call communitarian, the other we want to call textual, not without some parallels and analogies to Richard Rorty’s pair of solidarity and self-creation (from his brilliant and highly influential Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity), as writers following the former theme think mainly about “community” and “society”, while those following the other one think mainly about the “text”. It is not a traditional opposition between knowing the world and expressing one’s self, though. Marxian opposition from the eleventh “thesis on Feuerbach” remains closed within the world – the command being “change” the world, rather than “interpret” it. The opposition that I want to draw here – starting in French culture with Zola on the one hand and Flaubert on the other – apart from the world, takes into consideration also the text. And in such a form it seems to exist in Sartre with his opposition between “poetry” and “committed” literature, in Barthes with “writers” and “authors”, in Hegel in an influential Kojève’s account and in Nietzsche according to Deleuze (from Nietzsche and Philosophy), as well as in the opposition between dialectics and transgression, until a

5 The opposition between Zola and Flaubert is perhaps one of the strongest out of many possible and it can be read e.g. in the following Sartre’s statement from “Introducing Les Temps modernes”: “The writer is situated in his time; every word he utters has reverberations. As does his silence. I hold Flaubert and the Goncourts responsible for the repression that followed the Commune because they did not write a line to prevent it. Some will object that this wasn’t their business. But was the Calas trial Voltaire’s business? Was the administration of the Congo Gide’s business?” (1988:252).
doubtfully successful attempt to step out of it by Michel Foucault in his “intellectuel universel”/“intellectuel spécifique” opposition. (I would say more, I would like to see in the Rortyan distinction between self-creation and solidarity the same, European, French roots, the same contradictions and questions that existentialists – whose heroism is so manifest in Rorty – found themselves in. If I were to find in French culture a figure of a philosopher with somehow analogous hesitations – and a similar attempt at getting out of them – I would point, paradoxically enough and not without some doubts, at Georges Bataille who stood at the same time on the side of Hegel and on the side of Nietzsche and did not want to unite dialectics with transgression, but wandered in his thought from one to the other – which is shown by Foucault in his “Preface to Transgression”, a contribution to Critique issue devoted to Bataille. Despite the difference in cultures, time and space, despite the lack of any traces of Bataille in Rorty’s thinking, the inability, or rather a peculiar, programmatic and still justified unwillingness to choose between Hegel and Nietzsche, or between solidarity and self-creation in a parallel vocabulary, seems to bind the two thinkers together, separating them, at the same time, from e.g. Sartre, Barthes, or Deleuze).

Thus, to return to the main line of argument – the opposition is between the “community” and the “text”. It is worth noting that “community” (communauté) has recently become one of the most important terms on which some interesting philosophical discussions focus and whose point of departure is often Bataille’s thought and his subsequent projects (Contre-Attaque, Collège de Sociologie, Acephale) – suffice it to remind here of the books by Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot or Jean-Francois Lyotard (see Jean-Luc 1991, Blanchot 1988, Lyotard 1988). I suppose that the opposition distilled here is one of few constants in French thinking during the last hundred years or so – what gets changed is the point of gravity, bringing the scales down to the earth either on the one, or on the other side.

I take Barthes’ attempt to describe the situation in “Authors and Writers” to be paradigmatic. Who is the writer and who is the author – who is our textualist and who is our communitarian (or a “Hegelian” and a “Nietzschean”)? What is at stake is, to be sure, the relation to words, to language. The author works in words, acts in words, the word itself is neither an instrument, nor a tool, nor a vehicle for him. He asks the question “how to write?” and, paradoxically enough, as Barthes puts it, that “narcissistic activity has always provoked an interrogation of the world” (Barthes 1982:187). The author takes literature as an aim and the world keeps returning it to him as a means (somewhat like in Kant’s “asocial sociality” or Hegel’s “cunning of reason”). Literature in his view is non-realistic but it is precisely that very unreality that allows it to put questions to the world, gives literature the power to “disturb the world”. It would be absurd to ask him about his own commitment – his (“true”) responsibility is that in the face of literature, just like in Milan Kundera’s ideas of the “wisdom of the novel” and its “history” from The Art of the Novel and, especially, from his
recent *Les Testaments trahis*. The author is the one who desires to be the author, his subject matter is the “word”.

Which is not the case with the “writer”, merely the writer, to remember right at the beginning Barthes accentuation. The writer writes in order to communicate with the world, he has political aims for which the word is just a means, an insignificant *vehiculum*. He bears witness, proves, demonstrates, instructs, gives lessons; language for him “supports a *praxis*, it does not constitute one”, language is an instrument of communication, a mere vehicle of “thought” (Barthes 1982:189). The author is like a priest, the writer – like a clerk. Textual authors and communitarian writers form a typology that derives straight from the reversal of Sartre’s opposition from his well-renowned text “What Is Literature?”: Barthes reverses his hierarchy claiming that all interesting men of letters were *écrivains* rather than *écrivants*, protesting against Sartre’s degradation of poetry and edification of prose. Out of the same opposition: aestheticism and language games versus social and political commitment, Barthes supports the other pole than Sartre does, forming (in his *Zero Degree Writing*) an alternative outline of the history of literature since the times of Flaubert – precisely, since 1848 – until the present, within which the “task of the author” is not “taking a position”, as Sartre of that period explicitly wants and in which the function of the author is not, or at least is not only and exclusively, *appeler un chat un chat* – and modern literature is not that “cancer of words” but is a place in which Flaubert and Mallarmé (as well as later no more socially useful Proust and surrealists) occupy a significant place. As Sartre notes, and it is important to bear that in mind: “A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take up arms. Thus, however you might have come to it, whatever the opinions you might have professed, literature throws you into battle”. And the writer takes up arms, but in

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6 See Kundera (1993), especially the leading idea that the novel is *le territoire ou le jugement moral est suspendu*. It may be the case that Zygmunt Bauman goes in the very opposite direction, as can be seen from his text “Angst in Postmodernity, or on Truth, Fiction, and Uncertainty” (unpubl. typescript). Bauman opposes Kundera to Eco saying that what separates them are different experiences, of totalitarianism and of postmodernity, respectively. Truth relegated from the real world may find its shelter – precisely in the world of fiction, in the novel. The novel would not have to be the “paradise of the individuals” as in Kundera from *The Art of the Novel*, as the postmodern world does not lack diversity, but it may be the world of constant truths that can no longer get through today’s polyphony. Unlimited possibilities seem to be provided by the world itself, so the shelter for a coherent vision of the world may be fiction. At the same time, Bauman’s vision is alternative to the one drawn by Rorty in his “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” (Rorty 1991).

7 Jean-Paul Sartre, “What Is Literature?”, op. cit., p. 69. That is reminded by Allan Stoekl in his excellent book *Agonies of the Intellectual* (1992:307). Generally speaking, I agree to a large extent with Stoekl’s account of postwar French thought; I consider his discussions extremely valuable and I am making here use of several points he makes there (e.g. I am using my opposition between “Hegelians” and “Nietzscheans” in a sense similar to his “communitarians” and “textualists”).
Sartre’s ideal the very writing is arms, as is the pen serving to help the oppressed rather than the oppressors, for to understand the society in which he lives, the writer has just one way — to accept the point of view of its least privileged members.\(^8\) Which obviously gives birth to unhappy consciousness and bad conscience as Sartre from “Introducing Les Temps modernes” puts it: “That legacy of irresponsibility has troubled a number of minds. They suffer from a literary bad conscience and are no longer sure whether to write is admirable or grotesque. ... The man of letters writes while others fight. One day he’s quite proud of it, he feels himself to be a cleric and guardian of ideal values; the following day he’s ashamed of it, and finds that literature appears quite markedly to be a special form of affectation. In relation to middle-class people who read him, he is aware of his dignity; but confronted with workers, who don’t, he suffers from an inferiority complex” (Sartre 1974:250, emphasis mine).

Sartre turned to Julien Benda with a (famous) reproach that the clerk is not among the oppressed as he is “unavoidably a host of oppressing classes and races”. The writer is expected to write in a simple and comprehensive manner, his language is supposed to be transparent and unambiguous rather than to form an amoral and aberrational “poetic prose” in which transparent meaning is covered with unclear and ambiguous senses. While for Sartre Flaubert was the beginning of the end of the French prose, for Barthes he was a turning point in literature being engaged, precisely, with itself. For Sartre the question of writing was one of the fundamental ones: “What is writing? Why does one write? For whom? The fact is, it seems that nobody has ever asked himself these questions”, he will note at the beginning of “What Is Literature?”. There are many reasons to write; it may be an escape from the world, it may also be a tool to conquer the world. But “one can flee into a hermitage, into madness, into death. One can conquer by arms. Why does it have to be writing, why does one have to manage one’s escapes and conquests by writing?” (Sartre 1974:48 emphasis mine). According to Sartre, the writer has just one single subject — freedom. He writes as a free man to other free men (and it is here that writing meets democracy, like in Kundera, or in Derrida with his strongly defended idea of tout dire, freedom of “telling everything”). Thus to write — means to desire freedom in a specific way. It means to speak to one’s contemporaries, to stick to one’s epoch, without wanting to lose anything from it. There may be more beautiful epochs, surely there are — but that one is ours, Sartre will say in “Introducing Les Temps modernes”. The task of the writer is to produce transformations in the surrounding society: both in man’s situation as well as in his account of himself. The task of the writer is to provide the society in which he lives with unhappy consciousness — to present its picture to the society making it either either accept that picture as its own or get changed.

\(^8\) As he will say a little later, in “A Plea for Intellectuals” (from Between Existentialism and Marxism, (Sartre 1974:255), a speech pronounced in Japan in 1968.
The place of the writer in society in the last three centuries took various forms, according to an evolution outlined by Sartre. In the eighteenth century, just before the revolution – in the times of Encyclopedists – the writer was seen as a “guide and a spiritual leader” of the society. The product of the intellect in that time was seen as an action – it produced ideas which brought about upheavals; one could contribute with one’s pen to a “political emancipation of man in general”. The writer appears to be a rebel, a rioter, a trouble-maker – he wants to change the world. Therefore the eighteenth century was for French writers the only “chance and paradise, soon lost” in history. The 19th and 20th centuries are according to him a period of mistakes and declines. They brought about a growing rejection of ties between literature and society; starting with “icy silence” – a work of Mallarmé, to Flaubert writing to “be free from people and things”, to Proust who was supposed to feel towards other people not solidarity but merely notice their “coexistence”, to Breton and surrealists. At first, writing was intended to destroy the world (1848–1918), then – to destroy literature itself. The key slogan appears here – irresponsibility of literature and writers. “The temptation of irresponsibility” has belonged to the literary tradition for a century, Sartre will say in his “Introducing Les Temps modernes” (Sartre 1974:249), which roughly corresponds to my textual theme in French culture.

Sartre’s thinking about philosophy and politics can be traced in an only recently published (1994) correspondence with Maurice Merleau-Ponty dating from 1953, the year of the abrupt end of their co-operation in Les temps modernes. What is the place of politics with respect to philosophy, what would it mean to withdraw from the world towards philosophy and philosophical books, what should be the philosopher’s attitude towards “the requirements of the moment”, to current political events? How far, if at all, is the intellectual to be “committed”? It was a passionate and violent controversy that separated people who had been friends until then. Merleau-Ponty did not want to allow to be closed within a framework of Sartre’s simple opposition between philosophy and politics – and put forward his account of what it is to practice philosophy. What was it that Sartre was not willing to forgive his adversary? The point was not only to place philosophical studies before politics; still more it was an attempt to justify such an individual gesture and generalize it for others. Let us listen to Sartre’s reproaches directed to Merleau-Ponty: “But I reproach you with something far worse, with the fact that you withdraw in circumstances in which you ought to make a decision as a man, as a Frenchman, a citizen, and an intellectual – taking your philosophy as an alibi” (Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 1994). Merleau-Ponty makes use of his right to choose, and that is what he is allowed to do. But he is not allowed to criticise anyone – and Sartre in particular – in the name of his apolitical position, according to Sartre. In Sartre’s view, philosophy itself is a form of wasting time. One is the philosopher only after one’s death – in one’s lifetime, he says, we are people who among other things write philosophical books (which is perhaps not the most important activity).
The controversy between the two philosophers concerned the question whether, and to which degree, philosophy was adopting an attitude towards the world, to which degree it was an activity. As Merleau-Ponty, clearly hurt by Sartre, put it: “Philosophy, even if one does not choose between communism and anti-communism, is some attitude in the world rather than a withdrawal from it”. The philosopher, an active member of society, does not necessarily have to face up to every event – no matter whether that would be the Rosenbergs’ execution, the war in Indochina or arrests made among French communists, for what he focuses on is the oscillation between an event (as a catalyst for thought) and a general reflection in the context of which a given event may be inscribed. Merleau-Ponty, defending himself against Sartre’s accusations makes it explicit that he does not want to be a “topical writer”, in a way similar, incidentally, to Vladimir Nabokov who in his text “On a Book Entitled Lolita” says the following: “Lolita has no moral in tow. For me a work of fiction exists only in so far as it affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic bliss ... There are not many such books. All the rest is either topical trash or what some call the Literature of Ideas”. With all genre differences and proportions respected, Merleau-Ponty defended himself against being taken over by that topical trash, keeping faith in what paradigmatically was put by Julien Benda in The Betrayal of the Intellectuals and which in turn was described by Sartre as simply “abstract daydreaming” and “blabbering”.

2.

If we say that Barthes’ “authors” are “Nietzschean” while his “writers” are “Hegelian” (in the sense of the opposition construed by Gilles Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy⁹), we will thereby step into a totally new complex of questions. That is, for sure, “Nietzschean” in a specific sense of the Nietzsche contrasted by the generation of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault – wanting to “flee from Hegel”, as the latter put it in L’Ordre du discours (Foucault 1972:235) – with the Hegel as he was appropriated and sold to the French public mainly by Alexandre Kojève, but also Jean Hyppolite and the whole generation preceding the aforementioned one.¹⁰

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⁹ See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy where he says e.g. that “there is no compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche”, that Nietzsche’s philosophy is an “absolute anti-dialectics” or that “Nietzsche’s work is pervaded with anti-Hegelianism”; these ideas were also popularized in his Nietzsche, sa vie, son œuvre in the “Philosophes” series, Paris: PUF, 1965.

¹⁰ See my text on Alexandre Kojève: “Philosophy – Politics – Changing the World (the French Hegelianism: between Textual Work and Political Propaganda)” in: T. Buksiński (1998) And perhaps it is not accidentally that both Foucault and Althusser, as well as Derrida participated in Jean Hyppolite’s seminars, and the early works of the former two concerned just Hegel. Foucault’s text got lost, while a part of Althusser’s text can be found in a special Hegelian issue of Magazine littéraire.
Thus we can get the following opposition: Nietzsche, Barthes' authors, Sartre's poetry, textuality _contra_ Hegel, Barthes' writers, Sartre's prose, communality. We thereby enlarge the stakes: no longer only literature, but also philosophy, no longer the man of letters, but also the philosopher — which may have been clear since the very beginning of our considerations, as it was at the beginning of those put forward by Sartre in his "What Is Literature?". Only one figure is Hegelian and Nietzschean at the same time — Georges Bataille who reads at the same time both of them, who thinks both dialectically and transgressively, who listens to Kojève (although, as some say, snoring during his lectures), comes from the circle of dissident surrealists and founds subsequent, still more secret "communities". Bataille's work, without getting into too many details here (as we were doing it elsewhere — see Kwick (1997a, 1997b)), opens into two sides at the same time: in _Summa theologiae_ it opens to Nietzsche, and in _The Cursed Share_ it opens to Hegel and Marx (see Besniev 1988). These are radically oppositional projects which transgress and nullify each other, if one could have a look at them from a single, higher, synthetizing perspective. Bataille does not choose between them; both communities — a textual and a political one, the one that focuses on "writing", "negativity" as well as "poetry, laughter, and ecstasy" (that is, on what Hegel left over in his system in Bataille’s account), and the one that focuses on economic and political "tasks" and "missions" — remain in a state of war with each other. It is like two intellectuals in one person, as Allan Stoekl notes, and, furthermore, "this duality of Bataille's project, in one sense, is no different from the split we have seen running through French intellectual activity in general in the twentieth century" (Stoekl 1985:295). It is as if, at the same time, both Zola and Flaubert, or both Maurice Blanchot who searches for a "community of readers" and Alexandre Kojève who searches while reading Hegel "a work of political propaganda". As if both Rorty, the songster of self-creation, and Rorty, the songster of solidarity, loving alternately "Trotsky" and the "wild orchids", i.e. social issues and private joys, in his writing...

The Sartrian opposition between the aesthete and the committed writer, as well as its Barthesian inversion in the form of authors/writers, have not been seriously challenged until Michel Foucault — whose _intellectuel universel_, to be replaced by _intellectuel spécifique_, takes the meaning of both parts of the said dichotomy. The

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11 On "communities" in Bataille, see especially Maurice Blanchot, _The Unavowable Community_, op. cit.; besides, Stoekl (1985).

12 Which can be seen most clearly in the text "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme" from 1946 in which Kojève makes it explicit that "every interpretation of Hegel, if it is more than idle talk, is nothing but a program of struggle and one of work... And this means that the work of an interpreter of Hegel 'takes on the meaning of a work of political propaganda'" (Kojève 1970:42) Stanley Rosen in _Hermeneutics as Politics_ notes about Kojève's work that "it was not an act of philological scholarship, but an act of revolutionary propaganda". That opinion is also held by Vincent Descombes who writes in his _Modern French Philosophy_ about Kojève's "terrorist conception of history", by aforementioned Jean-Michel Besnier (1994).
point is writing, writer and his place in French culture: “the intellectual par excellence used to be a writer – as universal consciousness, free subject, he was opposed to those who were just competences in the service of the State or the Capital – as technicians, judges, teachers. Since then ... the threshold of writing (écriture) as a sacralizing mark (marque sacralisante) of the intellectual has disappeared” (Foucault 1994:155). The writer fighting for maintaining his political privileges has become in Foucault’s view a figure of the past – all that “feverish theorization of writing which we witnessed in the sixties was undoubtedly just a swansong” (Foucault 1994:155), and besides, it produced “so second-rate (médiocres) literary works”. It was not accidentally that Foucault – as opposed to, for instance, Jacques Derrida – often stressed that he had never felt to have a vocation of a writer. “I don’t consider that writing – he will say in 1978 – is my job and I don’t think that holding a pen is – for me, I am speaking only of myself – a sort of absolute activity that is more important than everything else”.13 Foucault’s response to Sartre and Barthes, to the split present in French culture for over a hundred years – and especially to the particular place accorded to the writer in it – was to be the figure of the “specific intellectual” who no longer derives from the jurist and the writer but from the savant and the expert (like Oppenheimer or still earlier Darwin).

Thus Foucault in my reading rejects both traditional functions of writing (and of writer): the avant-garde (textual) and the political (communal) one. So what is he left with? Not much, it seems, although at the same time there remains the difficult: local struggles described above and – rather impossible in the long run – struggles with one’s own incarnation as the “universal intellectual”. For how is one to make generalizations from local positions about precisely these positions, how is one to generalize without making reference to a recent role (whose clearly criticized representative is obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, the guru of the post-war France), bashing it, showing its incoherence, invalidity, even harmfulness? How to be both a local specialist and a theoretician of that local, intellectual specialization? How to convince others to that role, being oneself – functionally – a man from the previous epoch? Michel Foucault had to fight such a fight with himself, he had to promote in the name of universal reasons and in its terms new – “specific” – function of the intellectual. He was, to be sure, perfectly aware of that contradiction and it is perhaps therefore that in his work – like perhaps in no other work of living contemporary French philosophers – there are so many discussions about the place of the intellectual (or – the philosopher – depending on the period of his work) and his possible role in culture and society.

A careful tracing of Foucault’s changing answers to that question would be a fascinating task that would throw additional light to intellectual ruptures, subsequent new beginnings of the one who always wrote in order “not to have a

13 Let us add here, by way of a contrast, that Derrida on numerous occasions wrote and said about his passion as a writer, see e.g. (Derrida 1992).
face" (Archeology of Knowledge), to attempt to "think differently" (The Use of
Pleasure) — starting with the early seventies, a famous conversation with Gilles
Deleuze, genealogical struggles with Power, to the first volume of The History of
Sexuality, its last two volumes as well as to dozens of texts and interviews from
that feverish and extremely prolific period of his life. It was already in Archeology
of Knowledge that he said in an often referred to and commented on passage: “Do
not ask me who I am, nor tell me to remain the same: that is the morality of a civil
state; it rules our documents. Let it leave us in peace when we are to write”.

Foucault often stated in his interviews that he had never been a Freudian,
Marxist, structuralist: that he had been seen as an anarchist, leftist, disguised
Marxist, nihilist, anti-Marxist, technocrat, new liberal, but “none of these
descriptions is important in itself; on the other hand, taken together, they
nevertheless mean something. And I must admit I rather like what they mean”
(Foucault 1994a:598). Precisely so, without consenting to any other description of
himself, he all the time kept looking for a paraphrased definition of what he was doing as a
philosopher, sociologist, finally, as a man. As Maurice Blanchot puts it: “what
seems to me to be difficult — and privileged — position of Foucault might be the
following: do we know who he is, since he doesn’t call himself (he is on a
perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the abandonment of
any pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a historian or a structuralist
or a thinker or a metaphysician?” (Blanchot 1990:93) We still do not know “who
he is”, as he does not want to join known and respected traditional disciplines
which he detests as long as he has not redefined them. Michel Foucault, looking
for himself, for many years was asking, among other things, what the philosopher
was doing when philosophizing. He kept asking about himself and about others.
He also kept asking about himself as opposed to others and in distinction to them,
searching for some general meaning of his work. Let us recall here at least several
ideas that appear in his writings in that context.

3.

In a 1972 conversation with Deleuze — later to be known as “Intellectuals and
Power” — Foucault said that during May events in France “the intellectual
discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know
perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly
capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which
blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not
only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and
subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of
this system of power — the idea of their responsibility for ‘consciousness’ and
discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual’s role is ... to struggle against
the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere
of ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘discourse’” (Foucault 1977:207—
208) So if the traditional intellectual is – as we already know – the writer, there is no possibility of resistance on the part of either écrivants or écrivains, either poetry or littérature engagée, against that “enigmatic” Power which is “at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous”. It can be said, exit the writer, but who enters the stage? Precisely who enters is someone about whom we know from Foucault’s descriptions only what he is supposed not to do and who he is supposed not to be. Although the opposition of the two types of intellectuals is merely a “hypothesis” (Foucault 1980:132), it is directed against the whole French intellectual tradition, with Sartre at the forefront.

Theory in Foucault’s account is not supposed to be a support for practice which, in turn, would be its application; theory does not serve practical applications, being local, regional and non-totalizing. “This is a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious”. The point, as Foucault explains to Deleuze, is “to sap power, to take power”: “it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle” (Foucault 1977:208). The writer’s thinking of the world may have been universal, in Foucault’s vision suggested here the specific intellectual is reduced to play the role of one of many links in an ongoing struggle – he is neither a spokesperson of the will of those who fight, nor is he their representative (which means drawing radical conclusions from questioning of representation), nor is he even an interpreter of their struggles from a safe place behind his desk. Theory becomes practice. Those who until then had been accorded a specific place in culture of its “consciousness”, “conscience” and “eloquence” – become potential providers of tools for analysis, of that famous “toolbox” with the help of which one can make a topographical description of a battlefield... For Foucault, his own philosophy was not the theory of his practice, his political practice not being an application of theories presented in philosophical books of which he was the author. As Francois Ewald, Arlette Farge, and Michelle Perrot say in a moving commemorative volume entitled Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité: “there are only practices, theoretical practices or political practices, totally specific ones” (Ewald et al. 1985:54).

The intellectual’s work according to Foucault does not consist in shaping the others’ political will. It rather consists in conducting analyses on the grounds of disciplines familiar to him whose aim is, as he puts in a conversation with Francois Ewald, “to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to re-examine rules and institutions and on the basis of this reproblematization (in which he carries out his specific task as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has his role as a citizen to play)” (Foucault 1988:265). Michel Foucault is fully aware of the demise of an old, traditional, prophetic function of the intellectual. Those who speak and write today are still haunted by the model of a Greek wise man, Jewish
prophet or a Roman legislator. 

(And it is important to note that it was also Sartre who in the last years of his life considered breaking with the conception of the "committed writer". In 1974 in a discussion with Herbert Marcuse he said that workers "can better express what the feel, what they think... For me, the classical intellectual is an intellectual who ought to disappear". Foucault himself wants to take care of the present as the most important question is the one about the present. And that is what he was doing, discussing in his books over the years the relations between experience (madness, illness, transgression, sexuality), knowledge (psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (institutions connected with the control of the individual – psychiatric or penal ones). As he said in Discipline and Punish, what was at stake there – and surely not only there – was "writing the history of the present" (Foucault 1979:31) that would perhaps "make the present situation comprehensible and, possibly, lead to action" (Foucault 1988:101). That large theme of the "ontology of the present" guided Foucault's thinking in the last years of his life and he found the proplast of this way of thinking about philosophy (as we have known at least since Borges that we produce our predecessors) in Kant from the text "What Is the Enlightenment?", about which he would write and lecture in Collège de France. The task of philosophy is to describe the nature of the present and us in that present, he would say (Foucault 1988a:36), inscribing his thought in the tradition running from Kant to Weber to the Frankfurt School. The late Foucault made every attempt to inscribe himself in the Kantian tradition of making a mature use of reason, but he read Kant via the Baudelairean figure of the dandy. In ethics as aesthetics of existence in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, he seems to break with an opposition, difficult to maintain in practice of which we are still thinking here. He moves towards himself, towards building his own ethics of self-transformation. Intellectual work seems not to go beyond oppositions drawn by Sartre and Barthes, beyond our textualism and communality, or romanticism and pragmatism if we refer this issue to Rorty. Foucault becomes Rorty's "knight of autonomy" when he notes (in 1983) that for him "intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning transforming yourself. ... I know very well, and I think I knew it from the moment when I was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for transforming the world.

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14 See the interview with Foucault conducted by B.-H. Lévy, reminded recently in Lévy (1991:382).
15 Which is reminded by L. W. Kritzman (1992:140–177).
16 As Foucault said: "Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present" (Foucault 1988:262).
17 As Sartre (1968:299) said in his Baudelaire: "Baudelaire's single most favourite activity was changing: changing his own body, feelings, life — in search of an unattainable ideal of creating oneself. He works only not to owe anything to anyone, he wants to regenerate and correct himself, as one corrects a picture or a poem, he wants to his own poem for himself..."
Maybe I am wrong ... But if I refer to my own personal experience I have the feeling knowledge can’t do anything for us and that political power can destroy us. All the knowledge in the world can’t do anything against that” (Foucault 1988b:14).

Thus it is not much that Foucault’s *intellectuel spécifique*, a new figure suggested for our postmodern times, can do. Local and regional struggles with power die out, theory is no longer like a fellow-traveller of masses fighting to seize power. Parasurrealistic – that is, strange though it may sound, modernistic! — transforming one’s existence in a poetic manner has little to do with the Sartrian pole of “activism” and “commitment”, with law-giving, suggesting solutions valid always and everywhere, prophesizing about the future on the part of (intellectual and philosophical) legislators from a universal place accorded by culture in the past. But, on the other hand, that aesthetic of existence does not seem to go beyond the other pole of Sartre’s and Barthes’ oppositions — aesthetic, narcissistic, dandy-like, textual. The attempt to go beyond a framework imposed on writing and philosophizing some hundred years ago, as we try to outline it here, seems to be misguided and unsuccessful. The final acceptance of the fact that “my problem is my own transformation” and that what is at stake is “transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge” (Foucault 1988b:14), that, to refer to the well-known citation, “we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (for our self is not pre-given to us and we do not discover its truth) (Foucault 1984:351) – seems to lead back to modernistic oppositions. The point is not merely “a certain amount of knowledgabiliteness”, it is also “the knower’s straying afield of himself”: “There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all”, as he will say in the “Introduction” to the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*.

We would be willing to accept as one of such attempts of the said *penser autrement* the conception of the specific intellectual, never developed and never made more precise, never put into practice, i.e. experienced. The “aesthetic of existence” of the last two (published) volumes of *The History of Sexuality* and numerous interviews preceding them has shown difficulties in going beyond the pre-existing constant in French thinking. The intellectual in a classical sense, banned and criticized – returned, that is to say, who returned was Foucault writing rather than (“locally and regionally”) acting. It turned out that even the idea of ethics as aesthetics of existence is an idea of a writer who obviously has a different place and different obligations in today’s postmodern aura rather than an

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19 Let us remind here the most important texts for the “aesthetics of existence”: “Introduction” to *The Use of Pleasure* (which earlier functioned as a separate text), the “Qu’est-ce que les Lumieres?” text (from P. Rabinow’s collection, and then for the first time in French in the Kantian issue of *Magazine littéraire*, Avril 1993), “L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté” (*Dits et écrits*, IV, pp. 708–729), “Une esthétique de l’existence” (ibidem, pp. 730–35), as well an English interview given to Dreyfus and Rabinow and published as “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress” (in Foucault 1984).
idea of the one who was born out of the "expert" and "savant", i.e. of the specific intellectual. When the turmoil of (post-May '68) struggles with power disappeared, when came the consciousness of moderate possibilities of the philosopher as a philosopher came, what remained was seducing others with one's pen and showing oneself as an example for others: a classical idea of providing exemplum for one's descendants.20 Some parts of The History of Sexuality are disarming in their sincerity, in their tone of personal confessions, in their seriousness of histories put down by a feverish hand. Foucault – to return to Sartre – was engaged ("committed") in his writing: not in politics, ideology, but in a new, still thought-of morality and ethics. For the idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules "is now disappearing, as he says, has already disappeared. To this absence of a morality, one responds, one must respond with a research which is that of an aesthetics of existence" (Foucault 1989:311).

4.

Numerous critics (e.g. Richard Bernstein) see in Michel Foucault the passion of a moralist, and often a reproach directed to him is precisely his "cryptonormativism" (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser), his unwillingness to accept his indebtedness to the Enlightenment; for some commentators the philosophy of the late Foucault is the "philosophy of freedom" (John Rajchman).21 He is not exactly the communitarian or the textualist in the sense presented in this text. Who is he? Although in his theory he probably did not manage to transcend Sartre's opposition (Sartre, that "man of the nineteenth century who wished to conceive of the twentieth century"), in practice, in his written work, one can look for new ways of answering the latter's questions. Hence radically different valuations and interpretations of Foucault as a philosopher, philosopher of politics or moral philosopher.22 In his practice, the author of The History of Sexuality does not fit in the horizon of sense outlined in the opposition discussed here, for although for some he is a dispassionate "aesthete", for others he is a passionate "moralist", a par excellence political philosopher, a radical critic of the status quo, an originator of a new politics of resistance, a new liberal etc; for some he is the follower of Kant and the light side of sociologie de la modernité, for others the follower of the dark, irrational side of

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20 As is reminded by Tadeusz Komendant, the author of the excellent and the only Polish book on Foucault (Komendant 1994:154).

21 See Richard Bernstein (1992); Jürgen Habermas (1987); Nancy Fraser (1994); John Rajchman (1985).

22 Arnold I. Davidson (1986:232) makes it explicit in summarizing sentences of his text: "Unless moral philosophers supplement their discussions of moral codes with ethics à la Foucault, we will have no excuse against the charge that our treatises suffer from an unnecessary but debilitating poverty". That is perhaps the strongest opinion about Foucault's ethics I encountered.
modernity, that of Nietzsche via Bataille, like in Habermas’ or Ferry/Renaut’s criticism. And the point is probably not that there are divergent interpretations, that is something we are quite used to — the point may be that we need new categories and new dichotomies to attempt to domesticate or tame Foucault’s thought.

A possibility was suggested by Foucault himself by way of digression in a long conversation with an Italian communist, Duccio Trombadori, in 1978, almost totally unnoticed in literature devoted to him. He discusses there the question of what kind of books he had been writing in his lifetime and draws a distinction between livre d'exploration and livre de méthode, or a still different one between livre-expérience and livre-vérité. Books-explorations and books on the method, books-experiences and books-truths, let us say. To be sure, in philosophy the downgraded ones have been and still are books-explorations and books-experiences — those most precious to Foucault. Books were as rich experiences as possible, so that the writer could get out of them as someone else, someone new and changed, precisely — transformé. The book transforms him and what he thinks: “Je suis un expérimentateur en ce sens que j'écris pour me changer moi-meme” (Foucault 1994:41–42). The author is a writing experimenter who transforms himself rather than a theoretician. He does not know at the beginning of his road what he is going to think at the end of it. Thus, to the question about the sense of philosophical work, we get two possible answers — we either explore the unknown and transform ourselves (and somehow incidentally — we also change others, as a book is an invitation to common participation), or we present truth and evidence for it to others. Returning to alliances with power, returning to philosophy and politics, let us say that it is perhaps so that books-truths were — potentially could be — moving on the same tracts with power (with it or against it); communicating, proving, justifying, legitimating, validating (like in the case of Barthes' “writers”). The question is whether the same can be said of philosophical books-explorations? It seems to me that the answer is in the negative, for they seem to be on a different plane, the plane of transforming oneself rather than the world (the plane of changing the world only after a round way of changing oneself). I fully agree here with Richard Bernstein, — who is evidently far from being an enthusiast of postmodern thinkers — who presented the following diagnosis of postmodern philosophy: “In the early writings of Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty these questions [ethical-political — MK] do not even seem to be considered. Yet as we follow the pathways of their thinking and writings something curious begins to happen — for each of these thinkers begins

23 See a (once) influential pamphlet of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties. An Essay on Antihumanism, in which Foucault = Heidegger + Nietzsche (like Derrida = Heidegger + Derrida’s style), Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990, a chapter on “French Nietzscheanism” or e.g. p. 123.

24 The exception to which I owe my awareness of that passage is Martin Jay in his splendid article “The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault” (Jay 1995).
to gravitate more and more to confronting the ethical-political consequences of their own thinking" (Bernstein 1992:11). I am personally convinced that it pertains to Derrida — recently just a moralist, and no less to Rorty and Foucault. "Something curious begins to happen" and that "something" in question may be associated with a decline of a super-project of modernity that makes some questions suddenly appear more significant to a growing number of people.

I was not writing here about Heidegger's and de Man's "affairs", as they are commonly referred to (about debates of the greatest minds of the end of the century on the subject of rectorate of the former in 1933 and his silence about the Holocaust and about the latter's youthful collaborationist and anti-Semitic writings and their potential connections with a literary theory developed later); nor was I writing here about violent, passionate discussions in France and in America about the questions of the "philosopher" and "politics", for that is what was finally at stake there (as Krzysztof Pomian (1990:471) so penetratingly put it, the problem of the relations between philosophy and politics in the twentieth century has become "the one of ‘to be or not to be’ of philosophy"). From that perspective, our century still remains unstudied and unthought, and — to add a still new dimension to our considerations — we are having a feeling that whenever we are speaking of Heidegger of 1933, to use Pomian's words, de nobis fabula narratur... So I was not writing about all these discussions, as I am doing it elsewhere, but maybe it is worthwhile just to mention that questions about that time, perhaps not accidentally interpreted today — will tell us more about ourselves, our today's history, perhaps even about our future... For it may be even so that our discussions would not pertain to Heidegger himself or de Man himself; these could be left to Heideggerians and deconstructionists. Maybe it is worthwhile to think about what the history of the aforementioned two thinkers can tell us about our history, about ourselves (see Nancy 1990). What I see as important is what the history of the two can tell us of our history, about ourselves here and now. For, I suppose, the thinking of past choices, attitudes, past silence, writing, acting is the thinking of the constitutive elements of our not so distant past rather than of some "aberrations", "mistakes", human "failings" or "weaknesses". If we left aside the general question: what to do with those biographical-philosophical discoveries?, we would place ourselves somehow somewhere else, next to Heidegger's or de Man's past, and in our calm, European, Mediterranean and civilized past. And what we mean here is the thought that deliberately served ideology, that hid behind it, profiting from it. That gap is very important — we mean using ideology in promoting one's own thought in a naive belief that one (as an intellectual, as a philosopher) can be the "guide of leaders", to use Plato's expression from The Republic.

Hannah Arendt in Between Past and Future says that nobody ever doubted that "truth and politics never remain in good relations with each other" (and Merleau-Ponty adds that "the relation between philosophy and politics has always existed, not for good, but for bad"). Truth and politics — that is, philosophy and politics — are "two opposite ways of living" (Arendt 1994:274). For when a philosophical truth
enters politics, it is almost certain that freedom can feel endangered. Who will dare to reject a — transcendental — truth of philosophers? Who will defy a totalizing, coherent and logical — ideological — vision of the world within which the philosopher provides us with all possible questions and all possible answers? Is the philosopher himself strong enough to resist the temptation to impose his truth on others as an obligatory norm? Hannah Arendt has found a congenial description for such a situation: the “tyranny of truth” (Arendt 1994:289). Therefore in Arendt’s account the philosopher is a recluse rather than a homo politicus; a philosophical truth is apolitical by its very nature. It is disclosed by the philosopher — in his or her loneliness. Like the Foucault of The History of Sexuality, Arendt seems to appreciate learning by example — “the only form of ‘convincing’ which a philosophical truth can afford without deforming its nature” (Arendt 1994:290). The philosopher begins to “act” when he transforms a theoretical statement in truth included in an example which for him is a limit experience. He cannot go any further, he does not have the right to. The philosopher’s position is thus to be located outside of the political field, such a philosophical being alone cannot be associated with “any political commitment or devotion to any cause”. The philosopher’s truth does not mix — directly — with the things of this world and if he wants to mix with it (which, incidentally, according to Sartre is a definitional task of the intellectual: se mêler de ce qui ne le regardait pas), then he turns to tyrants and Führers, from Plato to Heidegger, as she notes in her “Heidegger at Eighty”.

Finally, it is not difficult to guess that, to a considerable extent, I agree with the author of Thinking, as in the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty debate I take the side of the latter, and from the opposition of communitarians and textualists, I choose textualists. But that is merely my “individual gesture” of which Sartre wrote in his letter to Merleau-Ponty which I can make, as long as I am not justifying it with respect to others and as long as I am not imposing it on anyone. In an endlessly polyphonic and colorful postmodernity, there is enough place for freedom and for individual gestures insofar as they do not — in a Rortyan manner — humiliate others and cause them pain. Nietzsche said — “The philosopher means something for me as long as he is able to give an example”. And perhaps the point today is to give the right to different examples, the right for them to be merely examples. Some of them will spread, some will not; some will be fashionable, others will quickly fall into oblivion; some will get through to the reading public, to others no one will be ever convinced. Philosophy today may teach, as Zygmunt Bauman put it, “how to live wisely in a state of uncertainty” — it may be, as Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska said, “not a love of Wisdom, but a love of many possible wisoms none of which claims ‘final’ ambitions for itself...” 25 That is what I mean when I speak of a multitude of possibilities of personal examples today.26

I would like to close my considerations with a quotation that provides a decipherment, very dear to me, of what may be at stake in the debate about postmodernity. And I am reading this debate as the one of duties, obligations, tasks and place of the intellectual (sometimes the humanist, sometimes the philosopher) in culture today. A long detour in thinking about today to Sartre, Barthes, Foucault, as well as the French Hegel and the French Nietzsche is potentially important, as it may throw additional light to current concerns. Although I have struggled through thick volumes of texts by Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty and many others, I have never come across such a clear-cut — and courageous — description of what may be going on. Let us listen to Zygmunt Bauman from his Copernican Lectures given in Torun, Poland: “The stakes is the value of the capital accumulated by old-fashioned firms called philosophy, sociology, or the humanities, in which we all are at the same time paid functionaries and shareholders. The stakes is the current use and exchange value of commodities gathered over the years in firms’ warehouses. The stakes is the usefulness of firms’ statutes and regulations which we have learnt by heart, and in the application of which we have become masters. The stakes is the peace of mind, blissful certainty of authority, the sense of meaningfulness of what one is doing...” If this is the case, then indeed — we have years of hard work ahead of us...

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