HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE NATION-STATE: GLOBAL PRESSURES ON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

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ABSTRACT

The two dimensions of the state in transition under the influence of globalization are changes in the welfare state and changes in the nation-state. And both dimensions of the state are closely linked to higher education, especially to its elite segment, the institution of the university: which — in Europe — has been mostly state-funded as part of the well-developed post-war Keynesian welfare state apparatus, and which has been closely related to the modern construct of the nation-state. We are developing here the theme of the modern contract between the nation-state and the university and trying to see how the processes of globalization — via affecting the state — affect the public sector in general, and public universities in particular. Global pressures on both institutions are discussed, following a historical detour showing the modern link between them. The discussion of the global transformations of the public sector is then followed by tentative conclusions.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is the overall argument of the present paper that current transformations to the state under the pressures of globalization are transforming the modern institution of the university, and consequently it is useful to discuss its future tasks and mission in the context of the current global transformations of the state. At the same time, the legitimacy of, and loyalty towards, modern liberal democratic welfare states is under severe stress today and the whole idea of a (European) postwar "social contract" between the state and its citizens is widely debated. It has been argued that modern states came to be nation-states because they triumphed in war, were (relatively) successful economically and won legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and other states (Held 1995). The sovereignty of the state meant also the sovereignty of national educational policies and guaranteed state support for nation-state oriented universities (from the times of their
inception as modern institutions bound by a “pact” with modern nation-states since the beginning of the 19th century). The university used to provide the modern nation-state with “a moral and spiritual basis” and professors, as Gerard Delanty argues in *Challenging Knowledge* along Humboldtian lines, “constructed themselves as the representatives of the nation” (Delanty 2001, pp. 33–34).

National education systems were created as part of the state forming process which established the modern nation-state. They were born when states based on absolutistic or monarchical rule gave way to the modern nation-state: as Andy Green stresses in his *Education, Globalization, and the Nation-State*, the history of “national education” is thus very much the history of the “nation state in formation” (Green 1997, p. 131). National education systems contributed to the creation of civic loyalties and national identities and became guardians for national languages, cultures, literatures and consciousness. The modern university and the modern nation-state went hand in hand, or were parts of the same wide process of the European modernization. Consequently, as we claim here, reconfigurations of the modern nation-state today are bound to affect the modern institution of the university. State-sponsored mass education is, in modernity, the primary source of socialization facing the individual as citizen of a nation-state (see Spybey 1996). Individuals were given access to “knowledge” and the opportunity of becoming “educated” — “but enablement is combined with constraint upon the individual to identify with and participate in the state as a national project” (Spybey 1996, p. 59). European nation-states were engaged in authorizing, funding and managing education systems, including higher education, to construct unified national polities. And the idea that a military defeat (or a failure to keep pace with industrial development in rival countries) is a factor stimulating the state to turn to (higher) education as a means of national revitalization can be referred directly to the Humboldtian reforms (see Kwiek 2006a, pp. 99–115).

In sociological and educational terms, the issue of the “idea” of the university, following its outliving of “modern” forms, is still open. Let us be very cautious, at the same time, while discussing the relationship between education and the state under global pressures. In different parts of the world the education-state relationship has traditionally had different forms; its current transformations, consequently, may go in different directions, despite the influence of powerful homogenizing factors. Thus we need to be very cautious in our analyses and very provisional in our conclusions. It is interesting to note that in those countries having a similar position of education vis-à-vis the state, and those standing at a roughly similar level of economic development, national debates about the transformations of the welfare state (and the restructuring of the public sector) seem to be playing to
the same tune (European post-communist transition countries seem to follow quite closely the global patterns of reforming higher education and the public sector in general, already discussed but actually not really implemented in the major Western EU countries).

2. THE MODERN UNIVERSITY AND THE MODERN NATION-STATE

The crucial step in the historical development of European universities for our purposes here is what Guy Neave termed the process of their nationalization — bringing the university formally into the public domain as a national responsibility. With the rise of the nation-state, the university was set at the apex of institutions defining national identity: “the forging of the nation-state went hand in hand with the incorporation of academia into the ranks of state service, thereby placing upon it the implicit obligation of service to the national community” (Neave 2001, p. 26; a wider version of this line of argument is presented in Kwiek 2005 and 2006a, pp. 139–226).

The emergence of the Prussian and French (Napoleonic) models of the university did not only mean the shift from revealed knowledge — characteristic of Medieval universities — to verifiable scientific knowledge. These institutions were also illustrating the process of “the harnessing of the university to the modernization of society” (Neave 2000b, p. 5). The Humboldtian reforms and their French counterparts are also a crucial step in the definition of the Nation-State itself, by putting in place those institutions for upholding national identity, providing the means of perpetuating particular ‘knowledge traditions’ to which the emergent Nation attaches importance as unique expressions of its exceptionalism, and formalizing the type of knowledge necessary both for citizenship and for assuming the highest administrative responsibilities the Nation may confer (Neave 2000b, p. 5).

The emergence of the universities in Berlin and in Paris marked the termination of the long process for the incorporation of the university to the state (Neave 2001, p. 25).

The process of the “nationalization” of the university settled the issue of what the role and responsibilities of the modern institution in society should be. The emergent nation-state defined the social place of the emergent modern university and determined its social responsibilities. The nation-state determined the community to which the university would be answerable: it was going to be the national...
community, the nation. The services and benefits the unitary and homogeneous nation-state gradually, and over the passage of time, placed at the disposal of society went far beyond education and included e.g. generous healthcare systems and old-age pension schemes.¹

The idea of what constituted “useful knowledge” was being renegotiated in the course of the history of the modern university. With the advent of the nation-state, useful knowledge assumed a new form: it was the type of knowledge which “underpinned national cohesion, provided techniques, skills and understanding to ensure the administration of public order, health and the maintenance of the rule of law”. The university became “the prime source of such knowledge and the repository of the Nation’s historic, cultural and political memory, the preservation and diffusion of which was its paramount task” (Neave 2000b, p. 12). The production of this type of knowledge at the university became its public responsibility. At the same time, though, as Neave stresses, there was the other obligation of the institution: the second duty, conceived of under the influence of German Idealists in the form of the pursuit of truth.² It was disinterested scholarship driven by the curiosity of free individuals, scholars searching for truth.

While Neave in his papers stresses that aspect of the Humboldtian — and German Idealists’ generally — interpretation of the university in which “culture, science and learning existed over and above the state” and in which “the responsibility of the university was to act as the highest expression of cultural unity” (Neave 2001, p. 25, emphases mine), I would like to stress the national aspect of Bildung and the role of the university as conceived by the German thinkers in the production of national consciousness, providing the national glue to keep citizens together, fostering national loyalty and supporting not only the nationhood in cultural terms but also the nation-state in political terms.³

Following detailed readings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich W. J. Schelling (see Kwiek 2006a, pp. 81-138, 2006b, pp. 2-44), we are inclined to stress the combination of cultural and political motifs in their formulations of the idea of the university rather than (following Neave) merely cultural ones; perhaps even the political cum cultural motif. The classical German notion of Bildung from that period, and from the writings of these philosophers, to a varying degree depending on the exact historical moment and a given author, is certainly very strongly politicized. It refers to the cultivation of the self and of the individual but also to the cultivation of the individual as a nation-state citizen.

The tension between “the pursuit of truth” and “public responsibility” in the evolution of the modern university, Neave stresses, has been very clear in German writings on Academia. The dichotomy is
clearly present in the founding fathers of the German university as well. There is a clear tension between thinking about science and the community of scholars and students, truth and universality on the one hand, and the national consciousness, nationhood, the state and academic responsibilities to them on the other.

Increasingly, at the beginning of the 19th century, culture in the sense of Bildung became mixed with political motivations and aspirations, focused around the notion of the German national state. It is interesting to note that in a global age, both motifs have been put under enormous pressure. Forging national identity, serving as a repository of the nation’s historical, scientific or literary achievements, inculcating national consciousness and loyalty to fellow-citizens of the nation-state do not serve as the rationale for the existence of the institution of the university any more; but also the production of a “disciplined and reliable workforce” is not fulfilling the demands of the new global economy which requires workers with the capacity to learn quickly and to work in teams in reliable and creative ways — Robert B. Reich’s “symbolic analysts” — as Raymond A. Morrow and Carlos Alberto Torres emphasize (Morrow and Torres 2000, p. 33). But at the same time, the disinterested pursuit of truth by curiosity-driven scholars in the traditional sense of the term is no longer accepted as a raison d’être for the institution either (see Kwiek 2004a, and 2004b on the Bologna Process). Consequently, no matter whether we focus more on the cultural unity of the nation or on the political unity of the nation as the two distinct driving forces behind the development of the modern university, both motifs are dead and gone in post-national and global conditions. Neither serving truth, nor serving the nation (and the nation-state) can be the guiding principles for the functioning of the institution today, and neither of them are even mentioned in current debates on a global or European level (it is sufficient to read the communications of the European Commission about the role of the university and research and development activities in knowledge-based societies or World Bank’s and OECD’s views on the future role of the university which are underpinning reforms of higher education in most transition and developing countries today, see European Commission 2003, World Bank 2002, OECD 1998).  

The move towards the “nationalization” of the university was strong and the process of linking the university to the national state continued throughout the 19th century (as one commentator remarked, “the universalization of the nation-state went hand in hand with the ‘nationalization’ of culture”, Axtmann 2004, p. 260). The social purpose, missions and roles of the university in the emergent national state were redefined anew. Emergent higher education systems were clearly national systems, with their own national priorities and distinctive patterns of validation and certification of knowledge and education.
Civil service in the nation-state was closely linked with national universities and at the same time scholars (especially full professors) — in some countries — gained the status of public servants. The “nationalization” of higher education was inseparable from the “nationalization” of scholars: the introduction of the civil service status for senior academics served also “to impress firmly upon the consciousness of academia its role as an emanation of the national wisdom and genius, creativity and interest” (Neave 2001, p. 30).

The process of the “nationalization” of the university so vividly described by Neave has come to a close right now, together with the advent of globalization. I am in full agreement with the three implications of globalization for the institution of the university which Neave draws. First, globalization brings to a close the process of the incorporation of the university into the service of the state; second, globalization redefines the place of the university in society — from “an instrument for political integration” to “part of the ‘productive process’”, a driver of economic integration between nations; and third, it is the corporation that becomes “the basic organizational paradigm for the university” (Neave 2000b, pp. 16–17) or “society’s central referential institution” (Neave 2001, p. 48).

There is also an increasing awareness of the artificiality, or at least of the constructed nature, of nation-state citizenship. As Mike Bottery argues, it is only at the present time that “the political body defining the terms and boundaries of citizenship is something called ‘the nation-state’” (Bottery 2003, p. 102). Bottery stresses that nation-state citizenship involves a form of exchange, even if such an exchange is rarely fully articulated. In return for a transfer of identification and loyalty from the local and regional level to that of the nation-state, nation-states have provided its citizens with civil citizenship (the right to freedom of speech, rights to justice and the ownership of property), political citizenship (the right to be involved in the exercise of political power) and social citizenship (the right to healthcare and economic security, and educational provision) (Bottery 2003, p. 103ff). What is of major interest to us here is the social citizenship. The loyalty of citizens of nation-states is closely related to this “bilateral” agreement, although never fully codified, between citizens and the state. Should the nation-state be threatened, so also will its role as primary guarantor of citizenship rights. The social concept of citizenship has been under attack since the 1970s and critiques have come from three directions: a philosophical aversion to the paternalistic state; a pragmatic belief in the declining capacity of the nation state to provide social goods (healthcare, social security, education) adequately; and a belief in its inferior capability of providing these goods in comparison with the market:
All of these bear upon the status and legitimacy of the nation-state, and therefore upon the citizenship bargain, for if the state is seen as an essentially malevolent entity, needing to be kept as small as possible and having neither the capacity nor the capability of providing the goods it has claimed to provide, what right has it to demand allegiance, loyalty and duty from the individual? Why should individuals provide these when it does so little for them? (Bottery 2003, p. 105).

The philosophical aspect of this critique of social citizenship (or of the welfare state in particular) came from von Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* and Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*. The threat to social citizenship under global pressures comes from what C. Lash has called the "revolt of the elites": the wealthy cease to identify themselves with any particular nation state. The citizens-consumers may opt out of the political life of nation-states and shop around for the best low-cost citizenship, in the most profitable or least-taxed locations around the globe. Internationally mobile groups may be much less willing to cooperate with others in resolving local problems — as Dani Rodrik argues, "owners of internationally mobile factories become disengaged from their local communities and disinterested in their development and prosperity", if faced locally by both bad economies and bad governance (Rodrik 1997, p. 70). The forces undermining the loyalty of citizens of nation-states are varied and also include, apart from the critique of social citizenship and consumerism, political globalization, economic globalization and the new ideas of "mean and lean" states. It is very unclear indeed why — together with the possible dismantling of the welfare state and the end of the postwar "social contract" between governments, unions and workers, the decline in the capacities, capabilities and willingness of nation-states to provide some traditionally (sometimes even fully) state-funded welfare services, together with many other factors mentioned here — that national loyalty should not be decreasing? And if it is decreasing anyway, for some structural reasons, why the whole modern paradigm of the close link between higher education (civic, national education) and the nation-state should be as strong as in pre-globalization eras?

3. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: GLOBAL TRENDS

Globalization exerts enormous pressures on both the functioning of public sectors, as well as the very thinking about their functioning; at the same time, higher education clearly loses, with a different speed in different countries and regions, its unique character
as part of the public sector\(^3\); it has to compete with other segments of the sector for (generally increasingly competitive) public funds. The competition is fierce and its results cannot be predicted; in this zero-sum game the other competitors for public funds are primary and secondary education, pension schemes for the aged, health care, low income and unemployment entitlements and benefits, prisons, police, the military etc; to an extent, the result of the competition depends also on the social perception of what higher education is about today, how it serves society and how it should be funded; it depends also on the answer to the question of which benefits it is able to provide for the individual — public or private, individual and collective etc, and which are viewed as more significant today.\(^6\) Consequently, the link between the public sector and the institution of the university is as strong as never before — but all public sector institutions have been under fire (or under scrutiny, in more neutral parlance) in recent years (see Kwiek 2001).

Globalization seems to be changing the role of the nation-state: the nation state is gradually losing its power as a direct economic player and at the same time it is losing a significant part of its legitimacy as it appears not to be willing, or able, to provide the welfare services seen as the very foundation of the postwar welfare state.\(^7\) Nation-states seem to prefer not to use the financial space of maneuver still left to them, even if they could be much more pro-active than reactive with respect to the impact of globalization on public services, including higher education.\(^8\)

As William Melody argues, rising government deficits and declining average real incomes have forced governments to assess critically the performance and resource claims of virtually all institutions associated with the welfare state. As a major public institution, the university has been asked to justify its public service performance, its demands for public resources, and the efficiency of its management of these resources. For most universities this was the first time they had been asked for a comprehensive accounting as public institutions (Melody 1998, p. 75)

Universities — especially in Continental Europe — were mostly not able to respond to requests for more accountability. They have attempted to justify themselves in terms of the traditional Humboldtian notion of the university: academic freedom and institutional autonomy, disinterested and curiosity-driven research, the idea of a unique social institution founded on the basis of the community of students and scholars etc. But in essence, as Melody argues, the replies universities gave in response to a general request for the justification of their social role boiled down to the following: the university should not be held
accountable by anyone other than itself. Consequently, the university's arguments have been viewed by the government and business (the main providers of funding in Europe) as self-serving.

One way that globalization has had a major impact on education has been through what Martin Carnoy termed "finance-driven reforms" (as opposed to "competitiveness-driven reforms" and "equity-driven reforms", see Carnoy 1999, p. 42ff) the main goal of which is to reduce public spending on education. As he argues in *Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know*, the former set of reforms may contribute to the shortage of public resources for education "even when more resources could be made available to education with net gains for economic growth" (Carnoy 1999, p. 52).

It is important to remember that linking economic and social change to changes in how societies transmit knowledge, as Martin Carnoy and Diana Rhoten argue, is a relatively new approach to studying education (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 1). Before the 1950s, comparative education focused mainly on the philosophical and cultural origins of educational systems: educational change was seen as resulting from changing educational philosophies. In the 1960s and 1970s this view was challenged by various historical studies in which educational reform was situated in economic and social contexts. Today, they claim, it is the phenomenon of globalization that is providing a new empirical challenge and a new theoretical framework for rethinking higher education:

One point is fairly clear. If knowledge is fundamental to globalization, globalization should also have a profound impact on the transmission of knowledge (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 2).

And the impact of globalization on the transmission of knowledge is the impact on, *inter alia*, education and educational institutions, especially at the higher level. Carnoy argues elsewhere (Carnoy 1999, p. 14) that although education appears to have changed little at the classroom level, globalization is having a "profound effect" on education at other levels. But at the heart of the relationship between globalization and education is the "relationship between the globalized political economy and the nation-state" (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 3). To the question whether the power of the nation is diminished by globalization, Carnoy answers in the positive and in the negative. Both answers are important but the argumentation behind the positive answer is crucial for our purposes here. So in his view globalization diminishes the power of the nation-state because global economic competition makes the nation state focus on "economic policies that improve global competitiveness, at the expense of policies that stabilize
the current configuration of the *domestic* economy or possibly *social* cohesion” (Carnoy 1999, p. 20, all emphases mine).

This major shift of concern by today's states is towards economic and global concerns at the expense of social and domestic ones, which makes the state completely different from what Bob Jessop called once “The Keynesian National Welfare State” (Jessop 1999, p. 348). What it may mean in practice is a shift in public spending and monetary policy: from measures favoring workers and consumers to those favoring financial interests. Or as Carnoy and Rhoten put it, “globalization forces nation-states to focus more on acting as economic growth promoters for their national economies than as protectors of the national identity or a nationalist project” (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 3).

Consequently, the role of universities seems quite different from these two perspectives: the traditional (modern, national) perspective saw universities as useful instruments for inculcating national identity and the new (post-national, global) one sees universities as (equally useful) instruments in promoting economic growth and boosting national economies. At the same time, the debate on the university today comes as part and parcel of a much wider debate on the public sector (and state intervention in, or provision of, different, traditionally public, services). Certainly in the period of the traditional Keynesian welfare state regimes it was the state — rather than the market — that was deeply involved in the economy and in the protection of nation-state citizens against the potential social evils of postwar capitalism. As the World Bank's flagship publication on the role of the state argues, for much of the 20th century people looked to government or the state to do more; but since the 1980s, the pendulum has been swinging again, and the existing conceptions of the state's place in the world have been challenged by such developments as e.g. the collapse of command-and-control economies or the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. Consequently, today, the countries are asking again what government's role ought to be and how its roles should be played (World Bank 1997, p. 17). The state's behavior and the consequences of that behavior are under severe scrutiny worldwide (as is the whole post-war paradigm of the Keynesian welfare state).

In the developing countries, the retreat of the state in such social areas as health care, education or housing has had detrimental effects (United Nations 2001, p. 32). The report stresses the point that while in Western Europe privatization, deregulation, de-bureaucratization and decentralization have been carefully coordinated with the goals of the welfare state, and much energy has been spent on reconciling the acquired social structure and social benefits with the new age of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001), in the developing countries (in the 1980s) and in Central and Eastern Europe (in the 1990s) neo-liberal strategies brought about quite different
consequences. As the report describes the process from a historical perspective, “in barely two decades, the ‘reinvention’ movement and NPM [New Public Management] have set the tone and content of the discourse in administration and government in ways that sharply contrast with the course of its development during the major part of the 20th century. The proponents of these tenets were able to carry their message literally throughout the world” (United Nations 2001, p. 53). Even though their criticism concerned bureaucracy, in the last analysis it affected government intervention — as implemented e.g. through the public sector institutions — as seen in the Keynesian economics and the New Deal ideology. Markets and states should be seen as complementary forces — and the role of an “intelligent, democratic state” is to provide, through rules and institutions, an “enabling framework” for private sector development and economic growth (United Nations 2001, p. 68).

How is the public funding of education and education spending (as part of social expenditure within the welfare state undergoing restructuring) to be seen as an investment rather than a cost? Paradoxically, the unwillingness or inability of the state to increase the level of public funding for higher education (or in more general terms, to use Philip G. Cerny’s expression, the decreased state’s potential for “collective action”, 1995) is accompanied by a clear realization that — in the new global era — higher education is more important for social and economic development than ever before (see Kwiek on one of cost-side solutions to the revenue problem of universities — academic entrepreneurship, Kwiek 2008a, 2008b). The United Nations’ report argues that countries that want to benefit from globalization must invest in education, to upgrade their citizens’ skills and knowledge (United Nations 2001, p. 84). Martin Carnoy (as part of his UNESCO explanation of “what planners need to know” about restructuring higher education under global pressures) concludes that what is needed is a coherent and systemic effort by the public sector — which “usually means more, as well as more effective, public spending” (Carnoy 1999, p. 86).

4. CONCLUSIONS

There is thus an interesting tension between what most education sector specialists and academics dealing with higher education issues say about the future of the university and what political economists, political scientists or sociologists say about the future of the state, as well as the welfare state and its services in particular, including higher education. There is no easy way out of this apparent paradox. Perhaps this is one of those cracks in the otherwise seamless fabric of
globalization accounts regarding the future role of higher education in which some future, unexpected shifts in the relations between the state and the university may take place. We have moved a long way from the relationship between the modern nation-state and the modern university described by Andy Green (with respect to education as such, not merely higher education) in the following manner:

National education was a massive engine of integration, assimilating the local to the national and the particular to the general. In short, it created, or tried to create, the civic identity and national consciousness which would bind each to the state and reconcile each to the other.... Education was the pre-eminent author and guardian of this national identity and culture (Green 1997, p. 134).

All or almost all above assumptions no longer hold. Where higher education is heading under the new pressures on the nation-state (and the welfare state) — and especially why — is a critical issue to be debated within academe.

NOTES

1. There are two contrasting positions taken with respect to the impact of globalization upon the welfare state: globalization as the fundamental factor behind the retreat of the welfare state, and globalization as a significant but not critical factor. There seems to be no major disagreement about the future of the (European) welfare state in its current postwar form: its foundations, for a variety of internal and external reasons and due to a variety of international and domestic pressures, need to be renegotiated today. Major differences between welfare scholars are based on different explanations about what has been happening to the European welfare state since mid-1970s, about different variations of restructuring in different European countries, and different degrees of emphasis concerning the scope of welfare state renegotiation in particular countries in the future. Globalization and the welfare state is the issue that most sharply divides current researchers on welfare issues — and the future of the welfare state is crucial for the future of the institution of the (public) university today. The social phenomena of greatest interest to me in the present paper in more general terms—such as the recommodification of society, the desocialization of the economy, the denationalization of both societies and economies, the deterritorialization and
despatialization of economic activities, the changing
distribution of risks in society, the growing individualization of
society, the growing market orientation in thinking about the
state and public services, the disempowerment of the nation-
state, the transnationalization of welfare spending patterns, the
detraditionalization of nationhood and citizenship—all
influence the way welfare issues are perceived, how problems
are seen as problems and how solutions accepted as solutions.
And these processes are at least intensified by globalization.

2. There are three main principles of the modern university to be
found in German thinkers, the founding fathers of the
University of Berlin. The first principle is the unity of research
and teaching (die Einheit von Forschung und Lehre); the second
is the protection of academic freedom: the freedom to teach
(Lehrfreiheit) and the freedom to learn (Lernfreiheit); and the
third is the central importance of the faculty of philosophy (the
faculty of Arts and Sciences in modern terminology) (see Fallon
1980: 28ff; Röhrs 1995: 24ff). The three principles are developed,
to varying degrees, in Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and
Humboldt. Together, the three principles have guided the
modern institution of the university through the 19th century to
the 20th century, and possibly beyond. To what extent these
principles are being questioned today, by whom and in what
segments of the diversified systems of higher education is a
different issue. Very briefly, and without the necessary nuancing
of the answer, the principle of the unity of teaching and research
still guides the functioning of our universities, but not so much
our higher education sector in general; academic freedom is
under severe attack in both developed and developing countries,
from a variety of directions, including threats from the state and
business sectors, perhaps especially from transnational
corporations in selected areas; and the third principle, the
centrality of philosophy to the functioning of the university,
seems to be the most endangered, if not already abandoned,
both in theory and in practice.

3. It is interesting to refer to the traditional apologia of the role of
the nation (and, in a complementary and unavoidable manner,
nationalisms) in apparently post-national contemporary
societies as vigorously presented by Anthony D. Smith in his
Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995). In a concluding
chapter, “In Defence of the Nation”, Smith argues that “the
nation and nationalism provide the only realistic socio-cultural
framework for a modern world order. They have no rivals today.
National identity too remains widely attractive and effective
and is felt by many people to satisfy their needs for cultural
fulfillment, rootedness, security and fraternity.... [G]lobal culture seems unable to offer the qualities of collective faith, dignity and hope that only a ‘religion surrogate’, with its promise of a territorial culture-community across the generations, can provide” (Smith 1995, p. 159, emphasis mine). Considering the (still) fundamentally uneven distribution of the benefits and the ills of globalization, and the geographical concentration of its impact in selected parts of the globe, from a global perspective (without privileging the social and economic developments of most affluent parts of the world), Smith may be right. He may be right for millions of people from the world unaffected by global pressures but may be wrong for millions of others e.g. Europeans, especially in the context of the emergent European “post-national” community. The point of view of (Zygmunf Bauman’s) “globals” is certainly different from that of “locals” (see Bauman 1998), as the lifestyles and loyalties of (Leslie Sklair’s) “transnational capitalist class” differ from those of nationally-rooted, immobile, traditional workers (see Sklair 2001). The lack of any national rootedness of (Robert B. Reich’s) “symbolic analysts” is a serious threat to national cohesion but, from a global perspective, only in some locations (see Reich 1992).

4. For international organizations, “globalization” has become a key concept “with which to interpret the enormous economic, political and cultural changes that characterize human society at the beginning of the 21st century” (Henry et al. 2001, p. 19). It does not change its heuristic usefulness but it does serve as a point of reference in discussions between academics and policymakers. There are certainly other broad descriptions which could be used equally well such as, say, post-Fordism, postindustrialism, informa-tionalism, post-national, late modernity, liquid modernity, “post-work society”, “risk society” rather than “work society”, “knowledge society” rather than “industry and service society” etc. but it looks like the term globalization in its current usage captures them all.

5. It has been especially phenomena like “new managerialism” implemented throughout Anglo-Saxon countries across the entire public sector that has had such a substantial impact on higher education. I have to agree with Miriam Henry and colleagues in their book on the OECD, globalization and higher education policy when they argue that “education systems have lost their sui generis character. Organisation, structures and basic practices look similar in education, health, welfare and other public sector bureaucracies” (Henry et al. 2001, p. 33).
6. As Harold A. Hovey put it penetratingly, "the underlying question about spending will be whether, at the margin, higher education spending is contributing more than spending at the margin in other programs" (Hovey 1999, p. 17). Current reformulations of the social tasks of the welfare state are happening at a time when the traditional responsibilities of the state are under revision — as Hovey rightly stresses, "certain activities now viewed as part of baselines could be defined as outside the traditional responsibilities of government" (Hovey 1999, p. 60). Higher education has to compete successfully with other socially attractive forms of state spending.

7. The three leading European social scientists: Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, and Zygmunt Bauman view the social future of Europe from a wider perspective and provide additional arguments, through their rethinking of the welfare state, for the present author's point that the transformation of public higher education on a global scale is unavoidable. Habermas, Beck and Bauman, despite coming from different philosophical and sociological traditions, agree on one point: the transformations of the welfare state we are currently witnessing are irreversible, we are passing into a new age with respect to the balance between the economic and the social. With respect to welfare futures, the emergence of Habermas' "postnational constellation" carries the same message as the emergence of Beck's "second, postnational modernity" and Bauman's "liquid modernity": the traditional postwar Keynesian welfare state, with its powerful "nation-state" component, is doomed, and for the three thinkers the culprit behind the end of this social project in Europe is globalization, in its theories and its practices. None of them focuses on the internal developments of the European welfare state (like changing demographics, including the aging of Western societies; shifts in familial structures; the burden of past entitlements within the intergenerational contract between the old and the young, the working and the unemployed etc.); they clearly link the new geography of social risks and uncertainties with the advent of — mainly economic — globalization.

8. Arguments provided by Geoffrey Garrett in such papers as "Global Markets and National Politics" (2000b), or "The Causes of Globalization" (2000a) and "Globalization and the Welfare State" which he co-authored with Deborah Mitchell (1999) — about the public provision of collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and valued by players who are interested in productivity ("ranging from the accumulation of human and physical capital, to social stability under conditions
of high market stability, to popular support for the market economy itself”, Garrett 2000b, p. 313) — could certainly be used as arguments in favor of the public financial support for higher education. It would be interesting to see to what extent Garrett’s view that “the financial markets are essentially disinterested in the size and scope of government. Their primary concern is whether the government balances its books” (2000b, p. 314) is correct with e.g. postcommunist transition countries. My perception is that in the current ideological climate, it is much more than merely the books; it is also the direction of the transformations to the public sector. At the same time Garrett’s “domestic compensation” traditionally coupled with (economic) “openness”, referring directly to Karl Polanyi, does not have to necessarily mean higher education as a part of the public sector in the Keynesian welfare state. It might be that even if Garrett is right in his thinking about the real (rather than rhetorical) changes to Western welfare state regimes, the conclusions may not pertain to education which might no longer be seen as a collective good, which does not seem to be undersupplied by the market and which has not been a protective, conflict-mitigating measure against the market-generated conflicts (but still part of a public sector). Still another issue is whether high redistributive taxation remains possible and whether its future is related only to globalization.

On top of that, we are beginning to feel at universities the full effects of the universalization of higher education and the increasing commodification of research. For the project of the European integration, the theme of the new “Europe of Knowledge” seems crucial; the emergent European educational and research space becomes a significant component of the “revitalization” of the Europeanization project. The foundations of the European knowledge society (and knowledge economy) are constructed around such pivotal notions as “knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, “education” and “training”. Education, and especially “lifelong learning”, becomes a new discursive space in which European dreams of common citizenship are currently being located. A new “knowledge-based Europe” is becoming individualized (individual learners rather than citizens of nation-states) and the construction of a new educational space can contribute to forging a new sense of European identity. It is possible that the idea of Europe and its founding myths and symbols are being redefined; making this new education space (being constructed through the emergent European educational and research policies discussed in the present chapter), in which a new European identity is being
forged, crucial in discussing transformations of European higher education systems today (see Kwiek 2004b).

10. I am in full agreement with Anthony R. Welch when he argues that “it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand education without reference to such [i.e. globalization] processes” (Welch 2001, p. 478).

11. What is at stake is instilling a new set of values, an indirect influence over the nation-state — which is much more effective as a strategy in changing national policies than explicit threats of punitive sanctions, as Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres argue (Burbules and Torres 2000, p. 9).

12. As Manuel Castells comments, “the privatization of public agencies and the demise of the welfare state, while alleviating societies from some bureaucratic burdens, worsen considerably living conditions for the majority of citizens, break the historical contract between capital, labor, and the state, and remove much of the social safety net, the nuts and bolts of legitimate government for common people” (Castells 1997, p. 354, emphasis mine).

REFERENCES


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