

Marek Kwiek

Knowledge and History. The Postmodern French Humanities and Deleuze's Nietzscheanism

INTRODUCTION - „THE POSTMODERN TURN” AS „THE NIETZSCHEAN TURN”?

The general context for this essay is the following: postmodern philosophy was strongly influenced by Nietzsche, especially in his postwar French readings from Bataille to Blanchot to Deleuze to Klossowski. It was Nietzsche in these readings who provided basic contours of a new self-image of the philosopher (or the humanist, more generally): instead of (modern) thinking about changing the social and political world, philosophers now found new terrains for thought, no longer associated with History, and less and less associated with politics. From the perspective of this essay, it is interesting to think about philosophy through the lenses of the self-images philosophers (more or less consciously) assume. The transformation of the self-image of philosophers entails the gradual transformation of the role and place of philosophy in culture. For what is philosophy, in broadest terms - is what philosophers regard (regarded, or will regard) as accepted as philosophy. The passage from the Hegelian to the Nietzschean self image in France in recent decades heralded the advent of postmodernity - if we accept the idea that what philosophers think about themselves while practicing philosophy is culturally significant.

What remains to be done, and what is left over here, is to reconsider the postmodern (or Nietzschean) vision of the philosopher's role in society in face of what is increasingly called the Global Age: is there a new self-image currently sought that could respond to challenges globalization theory and practices bring about? What is the place of philosophy in the rapidly changing Academe, and what is the place of the Academe itself (from the traditional university to higher education in general, or „tertiary education” in more recent terms) in rapidly changing social surrounding? What remains to be done is also to trace the interconnections between (cultural, philosophical, intellectual) postmodernity and (economic, political, social) Global Age. It was much easier to think of the „postmodern turn” before globalization came as a dominant social concept in the 1990s; now, it might be safer to avoid the term „turn” altogether.

To start with the Nietzschean spirit in philosophy: Gilles Deleuze's contribution to the appearance and development of the postmodern orientation of the humanities and social sciences is still undervalued. Instead of writing about the unique themes he introduced to postmodern discourse (such as e.g. rhizomes and trees, difference and repetition, schizoanalysis, minor lan-

guages, war machines or nomad art), I would like to focus on his Nietzscheanism which, I suppose, has turned out to be most useful in the humanities generally today. I appreciate his impressive monographs on Hume, Bergson, Kant, Spinoza or Leibniz, as well as the books he co-authored over the years with Félix Guattari; but it was his book on Nietzsche - Nietzsche et la philosophie - that exerted the greatest, although hidden influence, on French, and subsequently American thinkers in recent three decades. It was Deleuze who introduced to the intellectual arena a new figure of the philosopher: called Nietzschean first and then merely postmodern. It was in Deleuze's book(s) and articles that the whole generation of such seminal writers as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida or Jean-François Lyotard found their much less socially-bounding, much more individualistic, self-creational and relativistic self-images. Nietzsche as read by Deleuze provided a powerful impetus for a generational change in France in the sixties, which continues to affect us today, in the account of the role, place and tasks of the humanist - be it the philosopher, sociologist, historian, literary critic etc. - in culture and society. The example provided by Nietzsche and read for current purposes by Deleuze turned out to be very appealing indeed. Both of them show what can and what cannot be expected from today's humanist. Deleuze is inspiring, brilliant, far-reaching in his conclusions. He combines an analytic talent of a philosophical reader with a visionary talent of a philosophical prophet.

Few participants in current discussions about postmodernity actually refer to the early Gilles Deleuze (as well as to the early Pierre Klossowski, frankly speaking) from their fundamental books about Nietzsche; much more is written in this context about Michel Foucault's or Jacques Derrida's Nietzscheanism. But, and this is the main point of the present essay, the „postmodern turn” we are currently witnessing results also from the „Nietzschean turn” the humanities took in recent decades: from the passage from the Hegelian (surely, more as read by Alexandre Kojève than as read by Jean Hyppolite) to the Nietzschean self-image of the philosopher, the Nietzschean in spirit change of expectations directed toward the philosopher (and philosophy as a discipline itself), the change of his or her awareness of participation in culture, history, and politics that occurred in the sixties in the French humanities. If there had been no new Nietzsche-inspired self-image of the philosopher in France, suddenly growing and suddenly more and more appealing to philosophers' imagination, there would have prob-

ably not been the books by Foucault, Derrida or Lyotard in the forms we know them today. A powerful impulse questioning the (modern) role of the philosopher as the one who changes the world of public and political affairs originated in a specifically reinterpreted (French) Nietzsche opposed by a new generation of thinkers to a specifically reinterpreted (French) Hegel. And that was done in a powerful manner by Gilles Deleuze.

The generation of Foucault and Derrida, Deleuze and Klossowski thinks that between Hegel and Nietzsche there is no compromise. But they still mean a postwar French Hegel and a new Nietzsche read in France, two intellectual constructs, needed especially by the second generation of French thinkers to settle their philosophical and intellectual relations with their predecessors. Vincent Descombes is basically right when he says in his *Modern French Philosophy* that the signs put next to Hegel and next to Nietzsche got changed in the sixties: wherever there was „minus”, there appeared „plus”, and the reverse.¹

One can assume a number of parallel interpretations of the Hegelian-Nietzschean passage of the account of the role and place of the philosopher in culture and society that took place in French thought in the sixties with the help of the aforementioned thinkers: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Klossowski.² Each of them can take as their point of departure a different aspect of the „change of sign” from plus to minus mentioned by Descombes. For it was already in the fifties that Nietzsche was a rarely explored margin in French philosophy (and were it not for Georges Bataille or Maurice Blanchot, he could have been hardly heard of). So what was so appealing in Nietzsche in the sixties? He attracted philosophers with his otherness, methodophobia, idiosyncrasies, personal tones, vividness of metaphoric, versatility of styles, multitude of genres, as well as, more philosophically speaking, with his criticism of oppositional (binary) thinking, stressing the role of style in philosophical discourse, underlining the significance of persectivalism, possibilities of judging without criteria etc. etc.

THE ALLIANCE WITH NIETZSCHE

Before we pass on to the fundamental in this respect book by Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, let us say a few words by virtue of an introduction to his problematic about the book by Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*. The two books together provide a brand new perspective in reading Nietzsche. It is already in its opening statement that the book by Klossowski is conceived as a challenge to several generations of Nietzsche's readers, commentators and scholars: „This is the book that may testify to rare ignorance: how are we to talk about «Nietzsche»s thought' without ever referring to anything said about him before?”³ It was already in his text „Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie” (dating from 1957) that Klossowski, probably without thinking about the approaching Nietzschean turn in the French humanities, wrote about Nietzsche „we always tell him to say more and to say less than he said; we actually tell him to say more when we ally with him, and less - when we reject or distort him”.⁴ Bataille and Blanchot, Klossowski and Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, Lyotard and Barthes, all of them clearly „ally with Nietzsche” in a powerful strategic and anti-Hegelian alliance, and clearly „tell him to say more”. Some members of this alliance produced works of commentary, oth-

ers produced works that merely used him, hardly ever mentioning him.⁵

Thus Nietzsche in extreme versions is either an object of a thorough deliberation (Klossowski, Deleuze) or is a silent accomplice, a tacitly assumed and never fully expressed horizon of thought (Foucault). Nietzsche's thought in Deleuze is presented as an ordered, anti-Hegelian system; in Klossowski, in turn, Nietzsche does not present his philosophy but his „variations on personal themes” that rotate „around madness as if it were its own axis”.⁶ Klossowski's energetic interpretation, following Nietzsche, asks the question who the philosopher could be. In a violent, anti-Hegelian move Nietzsche as read by him is not willing either to think from the perspective of the „care for the human condition”, or to be a traditional „teaching” philosopher. „Who is the adversary, who is the enemy one is to defeat? The more fully thought is able to nail him, Klossowski says, the more powerful it becomes. To determine its adversary is to produce one's own space, to expand it, to breathe with it”.⁷



And that is precisely in this question that I can see the clue to the Nietzschean turn in French philosophy and it is by means of this question that I am going to show the role played in this turn by Gilles Deleuze. Hegel in the late fifties and early sixties became the enemy of the whole generation; it was the Hegel mainly from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in an influential interpretation popularized in France by Alexandre Kojève's *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, and it was mainly against this Hegel that arguments were presented and misreadings were shown; it was the young Hegel who was being attacked, owing to which one's own space was produced. Let us remind of Foucault's words from his opening lecture delivered at the *College de France* in 1970 - when the battle with Hegel fought with Nietzschean arms had already been won: „the whole our epoch (...) attempts to flee from Hegel”.⁸

NIETZSCHE - HEGEL'S ADVERSARY?

In Gilles Deleuze's study *Nietzsche and Philosophy* the enemy and the adversary in question is the same Hegel.⁹ Nietzsche's philosophy supposedly forms „an absolute anti-dialectics”; „anti-

Hegelianism runs through his work as its cutting edge", his pluralism is for dialectics its „most ferocious enemy" and „its only profound enemy".¹⁰ Between Hegel and Nietzsche „there is no compromise". Or still differently: „we will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see «against whom» its practical concepts are directed. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it fights" (162).

Thus the context is quite clear: the common Nietzsche's and Deleuze's enemy is dialectics and Hegel.¹¹ Nietzsche in Deleuze is lightness, pleasure, affirmation, joy, irresponsibility; Hegel and dialectics, in turn, mean heaviness, work, negation, duty and responsibility. Nietzsche replaces a „speculative element of negation" with a „practical element of difference: the object of affirmation and pleasure" (9). Deleuze attempts to make Nietzsche more „dialectic" in his reading and is not willing to fight Hegel on the terrain chosen by him, hence Nietzschean pairs of oppositions seem paradoxical and non-philosophical. If on the one hand we have dialectical negation, on the other we have differentiating affirmation and the „ethics of joy" corresponding to it. Thought is supposed to become „light", „affirmative", „dancing" - finally, it is supposed to „exclude any negativity" (41).

Deleuze attacks dialectics with Nietzschean arms claiming e.g. that it avoids putting the fundamental question: „Who is to perform critique, who is capable of it?" We are told about reason, spirit, self-knowledge, man; but who is in question in all these concepts? The question „who?" is the most important one - dialectics makes use of the pairs universal/particular, general/specific, infinite/finite which are merely symptoms, and the question to be asked is: who is particular, specific, and finite. Who is the subject in question, what are the forces in play? The solutions presented by dialectics are fictitious, Deleuze says, for its problems are fictitious because it treats symptoms in an abstract manner. Nietzsche in a comprehensive, not to say systematic, account presented by Deleuze¹² is against any thought referring to the negative, opposes any thought that makes use of the power of the negative, any thought that moves within an element of the negative and uses negation as a driving force, power and quality. Nietzsche opposes the famous power of positivity of the negative with his own discovery: the negativity of the positive, according to Deleuze. It is not difficult to identify the enemy fought by Nietzsche in Deleuze's account: philosophy is to become the art of interpretation and judgement, asking with respect to everything the question „who?" The meaning of Nietzsche's philosophy in Deleuze is the affirmation of multitude, becoming and chance. „The lightness of what affirms against the heaviness of the negative; joys of will to power against dialectics; affirmation of affirmation against the famous negation of negation", he writes at the end of his book. (The figure of the philosopher found and highly valorized in Nietzsche was subsequently supported by a series of fragments in a more popular book about Nietzsche. In the first part of the aforementioned fragments there is a section entitled „Who is the Philosopher?"). Let us just remind the very titles of the fragments chosen by Deleuze in this popularizing book: le philosophe masqué, le philosophe critique, le philosophe intempestif, le philosophe physiologiste et médecin as well as le philosophe, inventeur de possibilités de vie and le philosophe législateur.¹³ It can be seen

from the very titles what model of the philosopher - from among many possible ones - will be promoted by this popular guide to Nietzsche. To refer to *Ecce Homo*: „the very last thing I would promise is to make the humanity «better»".¹⁴

THE THOUGHT OF DIFFERENCE AND NIETZSCHE'S ECCENTRICITY

Let us summarize the above fragment. First, a clearly marked enemy of both Deleuze and Nietzsche as read by him is the Hegel from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, especially from the chapter on the dialectics of mastery and slavery, that is to say, the Hegel read and popularized in France by Alexandre Kojève in his *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Dialectics is „popular speculation", and under the Hegelian picture of the master there is always the slave, just like below the Deleuzian picture of Hegel there is always its foundational for post-war French thought fragment about „mastery and slavery" by Hegel, although read by means of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*.¹⁵ Second, the crucial words of this brilliant study are decidedly anti-Hegelian: affirmation, lightness, dance, joy, irresponsibility, i.e. the words leading directly to the next generation of French philosophers, the philosophers of difference (which for the first time had probably appeared on the margins of Hegel and Nietzsche in Georges Bataille¹⁶). Third, what is most important to us is not a slow change of the French „master of thinking"; the plays with Hegel - by Klossowski and Deleuze, or previously by Bataille and Blanchot (with the notion of *écriture fragmentaire* in Nietzsche suggested by the latter) - show that no intellectual hegemony is long-lasting, as is evident in French culture. They show, though, the new terrain later on boldly explored by postmodern thought.

To an extent, the eccentricity of Deleuze's (and Klossowski's) reading of Nietzsche will be treated as a model and source of inspiration for Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard in their philosophical investigations. Although Foucault devoted explicitly to Nietzsche merely two short pieces („Nietzsche, Genealogy and History" and „Nietzsche, Freud, Marx"), all his thought is immersed in Nietzscheanism; Lyotard in his *Libidinal Economy* merely mentions him, but the book is considered as a violent explosion of his Nietzscheanism; Derrida uses Nietzsche in his long-lasting struggles with Heidegger and indirectly with the whole body of „metaphysics" with Plato and Hegel as its main proponents. But what is important in my view is something else: it is the first time that a brand new attitude of the philosopher in culture was so highly and explicitly valorized: from Deleuze's (and Klossowski's) reading of Nietzsche one can read a certain coherent proposal concerning the place of the philosopher in culture.

PHILOSOPHY VS. „DOING HISTORY"

If we are talking about current philosophical stories (narratives, histories or micrologies) as precisely about „philosophical" stories, then the evolution of the very notion of „philosophy" must be seen as a very deep and thorough one indeed. And it is after Nietzsche that one has to locate a large part, if not the whole body, of the so-called postmodern thought. In many respects, perhaps, the very notion of the „Nietzschean" could be synonymous with that of the „postmodern". Postmodern thinkers are in such a close relationship with Nietzsche that they are often not willing to see it, or are not capable of seeing it thoroughly. Per-

haps the most fully aware of this affinity was Michel Foucault who did not want, like Derrida, to „overcome” Nietzsche and to leave him behind in a closed chapter of „Western metaphysics”. „The only sign of the affinity with such thought as Nietzschean is precisely to use it, to distort it, to make it shiver and cry”, Foucault once said in an interview. I would like to stress once again that postmodern thinkers are Nietzschean in the sense ascribed to Nietzsche by Deleuze (also in the sense ascribed to him two decades later in a famous interpretation presented by Alexander Nehamas in his *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* 17). What does it mean, without the burden of philosophical descriptions?


The philosophical choice we are talking about here made in the sixties was also a moral and political choice made on the margins of political, social, and ideological events in France of the beginning and middle of the sixties: the philosopher no longer recognized as his or her own the „Hegelian” (in Kojève’s version) mission of his necessary participation in vast historical transformations. Together with the passage from Hegel to Nietzsche (as well as to Freud and Marx, the other two „masters of suspicion”), there occurred a significant change of the self-image of the philosopher in culture. The response provided by Nietzsche (called „the New Nietzsche” in America following the pioneering publication by David B. Allison) in readings presented by his new interpreters is extremely important from the perspective of questions about this self-image, and the first, most significant moves were made by Deleuze (and Klossowski) who drew a picture of a newly read, specifically French Nietzsche.

The Hegel from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was first of all to link philosophy to transformations occurring in the surrounding world: the idea was to show that certain political proposals may be legitimated by certain philosophical proposals, and thereby philosophical knowledge may and should lead to political changes. Philosophy stood close to history and to politics. But the link in question was not satisfactory to the younger generation of French philosophers, currently called postmodern. The questions about progress in history, about a single „History” and its meaning deciphered by philosophers were on the side of the postwar French Hegelianism; on the other hand, Nietzsche’s vision could provide merely the multitude of separate and never totalizable small-scale „histories” produced on the basis of different „perspectives”. Over the question of the historical change, progress, and a clear account of the relation between philosophical thinking and political activity in Hegelianism there began a debate in which a newly-coined Nietzscheanism furnished arguments against Hegelianism well institutionally located after the second world war. The opposition between Hegel/Nietzsche with respect to the role of the philosopher and philosophy in history (that is, in what Emil Cioran called *faire l’Histoire*, „doing History”, in his *History and Utopia*) is clear: it is about the philosophers’ responsibility for history consisting in giving or refusing legitimization to political programs and choices that becomes more and more difficult to stand for them. The passage to Nietzsche and the turn against Hegel can also be seen as a turn against a certain place of the philosopher in culture and history supported by (specifically read) Hegel. In modernity, philosophy several times tried to stay close to power; in postwar France, philosophy tried to stay as close to power as possible,

and the ideal of the philosopher as a totally „committed writer” in the manner of Sartre and supported by the powerful account of Hegel as provided by his new commentators was very strong indeed. Philosophy was supposed to change the social world, and philosophers were supposed to legitimate History. The responsibility of this self-image of the philosopher was supposedly too heavy to bear. So there appeared intellectual space for Nietzsche in his interpreters. And when Nietzsche came, the road to postmodernity was opened (incidentally, were it not Nietzsche, there would have been someone else, I suppose).

HISTORY WITHOUT NEGATIVITY?

The attack launched by Deleuze on the Hegelian negativity - and on its „work” - was an attack on Hegel’s vision of history within which all events under the philosopher’s gaze gain some meaning in the course of history. Without the belief in the power of negativity and the power of the philosophical gaze, the homogeneous and retrospectively totalized history could turn out to be a contingent web of events - of unknown hierarchy of significance and undisclosed meaning in history.¹⁸ Negativity led in Hegel to change, and change has always been progressive. A philosophical account of history could only show its subsequent manifestations occurring along a single route; progress by negation was supposed to lead to the end of history. The gaze of the Hegelian philosopher provided a clear picture of those events that were significant from a philosophical point of view. History, philosophy, politics, and knowledge were interrelated with one another. It must have given additional power to philosophy and its representatives, philosophers; it must have influenced the social and political image of the philosopher.



The Deleuzian Nietzsche brings about a new relation between the philosopher and History, for he brings about also a new vision of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history was to look back, to give meaning to the past so that the present could have its meaning. Philosophers who were to put the present in a meaningful and always progressive series of events, as Kojève wanted to convince his readers, were responsible for the future. In the

Deleuzian account of Nietzsche (as well as in the Nietzschean account of Deleuze), philosophy is gradually deprived of increasingly heavy burden of social and political responsibility.

Deleuze refers to what he calls „pluralism” in Nietzsche’s philosophy; genealogy is opposed to dialectics and histories about the world are opposed to a single History about it. But as there are many of them, they can no longer legitimate judgements of politics, morality or aesthetics, for they cannot be subsumed under a single superior vision, with the figure of Reason at the background. In the Hegelian dialectics there is no room for constant interplay of different driving forces on which there depended the meaning of a given object, just like there is no room for the already mentioned here genealogical question „who?” Let us add right now that a different account of history leads him to a different conduct in the present: while the Hegelian „work of negativity” gave meaning to history as a narrative about progress, the Nietzschean genealogy sees all attempts to present a mere sequence of events as one, single history unfolding through its numerous manifestations as reactive thinking: thinking that comes directly from the perspective of the slave rather than from that of the master, to refer to the master/slave dialectics again. In the Hegelian vision of history it is the slave and his vision of history that counts. On the one hand we can have a grand narrative, on the other a multitude of little narratives written from various perspectives and under the influence of many forces.¹⁹

The elimination of negativity for Deleuze (and for Nietzsche in his reading) becomes a crucial point on which the sense of their history depends (the „new way of thinking” means affirmative thought, that is to say such thought that finally „excludes any negativity”). As negativity is deprived of its power, it is deprived of the possibility of work (and let us remind here Bataille’s „unemployed negativity”, *négativité sans emploi*) and there disappears the change associated with it, and hence progress itself. The questioning of negation as a driving force of history changes history at the same time in a sequence of historical events and deprives the philosopher of his or her Hegelian role of providing these events with common sense, ordering them and coming to conclusions with respect to the present and future actions. The web of close relations between history/knowledge/action is broken. And what follows is the separation of those who act from the justification taken by them so far from the knowledge of history provided by philosophers. Hegel gave us the possibility to understand the world and to exert influence on the changes it undergoes; the French Nietzsche appeared at the moment when understanding of less and less understandable world (the world in which it was more and difficult to explain and philosophically legitimate the dramas of the surrounding world, with Holocaust at the forefront) was becoming an increasingly heavy burden.

Nietzsche, to put it shortly, gave a chance to separate philosophy from politics, leaving engagement in historical changes to private choices of thinkers rather than to duties automatically ascribed to the community of philosophers. Political changes had no longer philosophical legitimization on the basis of the new Nietzscheanism, for Nietzsche (e.g. in the reading by Deleuze) brought about *une nouvelle conception de la*

*philosophie, une nouvelle image du penseur et de la pensée.*²⁰ What is most important for me is the second part of the statement, the „new image of the thinker”. The thinker in question no longer legitimates political changes, no longer attempts to decipher and to give sense to the surrounding political world by means of providing a homogeneous history - but he does not go in his aspirations to (Roland Barthes’) „pleasure of the text” yet as well.

THE CONTINGENCY OF THE NEW IMAGE OF THE PHILOSOPHER?

The most important for me here is the following point: in new French readings of Nietzsche some postwar philosophers sought ways to free from „history” and from responsibility toward its past, present and future events, sought a new self-image, the aforementioned Deleuzian *nouvelle image* which, with the passage of time, they could see as their own. And François Ewald was not exaggerating when he wrote recently about Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy: „Nietzsche would not have been for us what he has become for us today without the first Nietzsche [et la philosophie]”.²¹ I would be willing to add in this context: the same happened with a newly born self-image of the philosopher. Without Deleuze and his Nietzsche, the self-image of interest to us here would have been (at least slightly?) different.

One is surely entitled to ask at this point whether such deep



transformations of the self-image of the philosopher originated only and exclusively from reading Nietzsche? Obviously they did not. Nietzsche so seen was merely a point of convergence for some thoughts and some attitudes in culture, probably unavoidable in postwar France. (Hegel’s response would be easy: it was the „cunning of reason” that helped to give birth to a temporary interest in, as well as appropriation and reinterpretation of, Nietzsche for particular French needs; it was not an individual gesture of a group of philosophers but a wide and meaningful world-historical gesture). It was not that the knowledge of Nietzsche distorted and corrupted the traditional picture of the philosopher, infecting the French humanities with a new vision of what the philosopher as a cultural hero could be²²; it was rather so that the philosopher in question, wanting to flee from a burdensome arena of social obligations was looking for, and finally found, his or her new philosophical patron. The fact

that the humanities found its patron in Nietzsche results from a web of contingent events as well as from the appearance at the more or less the same time „strong readings” of his philosophy. Gilles Deleuze’s works gave the French humanities first impulses, later on maintained and brilliantly used by the whole postmodern thought.

CONCLUSIONS

What will happen with the Nietzsche-inspired and provided by Deleuze and Klossowski postmodern self-image of philosophers in the 21st century cannot be even guessed; the transformations the modern university undergoes right now - in the face of globalization challenges, in the face of the possibility of the decline of the nation-state and the general collapse of the cultural, political, social and economic project of modernity - will surely change not only the self-image of philosophers, but of all academics as well.²³ Philosophy gave rise to the modern institution of the university two hundred years ago and now it will have to find its new niche in the Academe, as the general move is increasingly toward an entrepreneurial and managerial institution no longer based on philosophical Humboldtian and Kantian foundations. The self-image of philosophers will sooner or later get changed - hopefully, not entirely out of the modern context of the Hegelian/Nietzschean debate, part of which were Deleuze and postmodern way of practicing philosophy.

1. Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, Cambridge: CUP, 1980, p. 12
2. The general context for the present essay - philosophy seen through the lenses of the self-images philosophers assume in culture and society - is provided by my recent book, *Dilemmas of Identity. On the Self-Image of the Philosopher in Post-War France* (in Polish), Poznan: Adam Mickiewicz University Press, 1999.
3. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1969, p. 1.
4. Pierre Klossowski, „Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie” in: *Un si funeste désir*, Paris: Gallimard, 1963, p. 188.
5. This division is widely used by Alan D. Schrift in his very interesting book, *Nietzsche’s French Legacy. A Genealogy of Poststructuralism*, London: Routledge, 1995.
6. Pierre Klossowski, „Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie”, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
7. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
8. Michel Foucault, *L’ordre du discours*, Paris: Gallimard, 1971, p. 74.
9. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze praises Klossowski for „renewing the interpretation of Nietzsche” referring to two his texts: „Nietzsche, le polythéisme et la parodie” and „Oublie et anamnèse dans l’expérience vécu de l’éternel retour du Meme”, read at the conference in Royaumont in 1964. See *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 312.
10. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York: Columbia UP, 1983, pp. 195, 8, 8, 8. Let me refer to page numbers in the text itself.
11. In various interpretations of of the Deleuze/Hegel/Nietzsche relations at least two positions can be indicated: according to the former, Deleuze reads Nietzsche for the characterization of his own philosophical stance and he is against Hegel and dialectics (see Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, London: Routledge, 1989; Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988); according to the latter, simultaneously with the strategy of a total opposition against Hegel, he

chooses still another one: he „refuses to descend and struggle on Hegel’s own terrain” and attempts to „move away from the dialectic, to forget the dialectic” (see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: *An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, pp. 27, 53). Deleuze in the latter account is seen as attempting to destroy the binary character of his and Nietzsche’s position with Hegel’s, so that Nietzsche as „anti-Hegel” should not suggest the beginning of a new dialectical process. Alan Schrift in his already mentioned *Nietzsche’s French Legacy* chooses a version of full opposition between Hegel and Nietzsche in Deleuze. But the problem I mean here - the problem of Nietzscheans writing „against Hegel” - is most clearly put in a brilliant book by Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, New York: Columbia UP, 1987.

12. Some commentators accuse Deleuze of oversystematization of Nietzsche’s thought. See e.g. James J. Winchester, *Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn. Reading Nietzsche after Heidegger*, Deleuze, Derrida, Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, p. 72.
13. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche: sa vie, son oeuvre*, Paris: PUF, 1965, pp. 49-58.
14. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufman, New York: Vintage, 1967, Foreword, 2.
15. See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjon, New York: Columbia UP, 1987, pp. 14-15.
16. On the Deleuze’s influence on French readings of Nietzsche, see the introduction to: Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, trans. D. Large, London: Athlone Press, 1993, pp. vii-xi.
17. See Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985.
18. See discussions about Hegel in: Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History. Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988.
19. As Clément Rosset writes: Deleuze’s thought is not in the service of any thought, any purpose, any particular theme. „Secheresse de Deleuze”, „L’Arc”, 49, p. 91.
20. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche: sa vie, son oeuvre*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
21. François Ewald, „Magazine littéraire”, avril 1992, p. 20.
22. See in this context my text „After Philosophy: The Novelist as Cultural Hero of Modernity?”, *Theoria. A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, New York: Berghahn Books, December 1998.
23. See my text „The Nation-State, Globalization, and the Modern Institution of the University”, *Theoria. A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, New York: Berghahn Books (forthcoming).

Marek Kwiek

is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland. [[He was a Postdoctoral Visiting Scholar at the University of Virginia (1994-95), University of California at Berkeley (1996-97), McGill University, Montreal (1996) and Free University, Berlin (1999); also a Visiting Professor at the Central European University, Budapest (2000) and an International OSI Policy Fellow at the Center for Policy Studies, Budapest (2000)]. He has published widely on contemporary French and American philosophy: Rorty and Lyotard. In *The Labyrinths of Postmodernity* (1994), Rorty’s *Elective Affinities. The New Pragmatism and Postmodern Thought* (1996), Michel Foucault *Today* (1998, editor) and *The Dilemmas of Identity. On the Self-Image of the Philosopher in Postwar French Thought* (1999), as well as numerous essays and articles.



MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

PISMO WYŻSZEJ SZKOŁY PRZEDSIĘBIORCZOŚCI I ZARZĄDZANIA IM. L. KOŹMIŃSKIEGO
I MIĘDZYNARODOWEJ SZKOŁY ZARZĄDZANIA

**W Komitecie Badań
Naukowych
Międzynarodowa
architektura
finansowa
Moralne dylematy
człowieka biznesu
Kontrowersje wokół
globalizacji
Reformy brytyjskiej
administracji
Knowledge
and History
Siła pieniędzy-
potęga Cash Flow
Jak rodziły się
standardy
rachunkowości**



**Witamy XXI wiek
przekonani, że świat będzie zmierzał
ku ludzkiej solidarności**

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